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Summary 
The right of way of necessity is a special type of praedial servitude that is 
established over neighbouring property in favour of landlocked property – that is, 
property without access to a public road. The purpose of granting the landlocked 
property a right of access to a public road is so that it can be put to efficient use. The 
servitude is created by operation of law and it binds the surrounding properties as of 
right at the moment when the property becomes landlocked. It can, however, be 
enforced only against a specific neighbouring property. This servitude can only be 
enforced by way of a court order, against the will of the owner of the neighbouring 
property. This servitude, specifically the manner in which it is established, may raise 
significant constitutional issues as regards the property clause of the South African 
Constitution. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate the constitutionality of the 
right of way of necessity in view of section 25 of the Constitution. 
To this end, the study provides an overview of the law relating to the right of 
way of necessity and the general principles regulating this servitude in South African 
law. Subsequently, the justifications for the right of way of necessity and specifically 
for allowing the courts to enforce this servitude are analysed in terms of public policy, 
jurisprudential views and law and economics theory. The conclusion is reached that, 
in terms of these justifications, there are sufficient policy, social, and economic 
reasons for having the right of way of necessity and for the courts to enforce it 
without cooperation and against the will of the affected servient property owner.  
These justifications are used to examine the constitutionality of the right of way 
of necessity, specifically to determine whether the enforcement of this servitude by 
court order constitutes a section 25(1) arbitrary deprivation or even a section 25(2) 
expropriation of the affected owner’s property rights. The study concludes that the 
granting of the right of way of necessity will not amount to an expropriation and, 
following the FNB methodology, does not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property 
either. Therefore, if all the requirements are met, the granting of a right of way of 
necessity will be constitutionally compliant.  
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Opsomming 
Die saaklike serwituut wat ten gunste van grond wat van openbare verkeersweë 
afgesny is (blokland) oor naburige eiendom gevestig word, staan bekend as 
noodweg. Die rede waarom toegang tot ’n openbare pad aan blokland toegeken 
word, is sodat die grond effektief gebruik kan word. Hierdie serwituut word deur 
regswerking geskep en dit bind omringende eiendomme vanaf die oomblik dat die 
blokland van openbare verkeersweë afgesluit word. Dit kan egter slegs teen ’n 
spesifieke naburige eiendom afgedwing word. Die serwituut kan slegs deur middel 
van ’n hofbevel afgedwing word, teen die eienaar van die naburige eiendom se wil. 
Wat die eiendomsklousule van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet betref, kan hierdie 
serwituut en veral die wyse waarop dit gevesig word belangrike grondwetlike vrae 
opper. In die lig van artikel 25 van die Grondwet was dit dus nodig om die 
grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te toets. 
Om hierdie doel te bereik, verskaf die studie’n oorsig van die regsbeginsels 
aangaande noodweg en die algemene beginsels van hierdie serwituut in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg. Met verwysing na openbare beleid, regsfilosofiese benaderings en 
Law and Economics-teorie analiseer die tesis vervolgens die regverdigingsgronde vir 
noodweg, spesifiek vir die feit dat die howe dit afdwing. Die gevolgtrekking is dat 
daar ingevolge hierdie regverdigingsgronde genoegsame beleids-, sosiale en 
ekonomiese redes bestaan vir die serwituut van noodweg en vir die howe se 
bevoegdheid om dit sonder die dienende eienaar se medewerking en teen sy wil af 
te dwing. 
Hierdie regverdigingsgronde word gebruik om die grondwetlike geldigheid van 
noodweg te ondersoek, spesifiek om vas te stel of die afdwinging daarvan neerkom 
op ’n arbitrêre ontneming vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) of op ’n onteiening vir 
doeleindes van artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet. Hierdie studie kom tot die slotsom 
dat die toestaan van ’n noodweg nie as ’n onteiening kwalifiseer nie en dat dit, indien 
die FNB-metodologie nagevolg word, ook nie op ’n arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom 
neerkom nie. Indien al die vereistes nagekom word, sal die toestaan van ’n noodweg 
dus aan die Grondwet voldoen. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction 
A situation may occur where an owner (dominant owner) of a piece of land 
(dominant tenement) finds himself in a landlocked or geographically enclosed 
location that denies him access to the public transport system such as public roads 
and railroads. In these circumstances, the first option for the dominant owner is to 
seek assistance from the neighbouring land to negotiate for a connection to such 
public transport facilities. This situation is exacerbated when the neighbouring owner 
(servient owner) refuses to give access over his land (servient tenement) or when it 
is for some reason impossible to negotiate for such a right. When a particular 
dominant tenement does not have access to a public road and the dominant owner 
is unable through negotiation to acquire such access over the servient tenement, it is 
said that his property is landlocked. Land may become landlocked through various 
factors, for example natural causes and human action.  
Landlocking problems may arise from subdivision and subsequent alienation of 
part of a tract of land with the consequence that either the land conveyed or retained 
loses access to a public road. This is usually caused by an omission or oversight to 
reserve a right of way for the landlocked piece of land by the parties to the 
subdivision, or when the owner of the subdivided piece of land does not immediately 
require the right of way due to other access arrangements over adjoining properties.1 
                                            
1
 AJ Bradbrook “Access to landlocked land: A comparative study of legal solutions” (1983) 10 Sydney 
Law Review 39-60 39. 
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In Wilhelm v Norton,2 an omission to provide a right of way upon the subdivision of 
properties left the plaintiff landlocked. In that case, the defendant subdivided his farm 
into two portions and sold one of the portions to his son, who in turn mortgaged it as 
security to the plaintiff.3 The portion sold to the son was landlocked in a way that 
denied the owner immediate access to a public road.4 No servitude of way was 
registered in favour of the subdivided property. The son continued to use the road 
that his father had used before him, gaining access to the public road over his 
father’s property, without the benefit of a registered right to do so. The son was later 
declared insolvent and his property was bought by the plaintiff at a public auction. 
The plaintiff’s property became landlocked when the defendant denied the plaintiff a 
right of access over the defendant’s land due to lack of a servitude agreement 
between them.5 
Voluntary action or negligence on the part of the dominant owner can also 
cause landlocking, for example where the dominant owner neglects a road that 
connects him to a public road, allowing it to reach such a state of disrepair that it 
becomes unusable. This is what happened in Rudolph v Casojee.6 In that case the 
plaintiff and his predecessors in title abandoned a road that had been used for more 
                                            
2
 1935 EDL 143. On the issue of subdivision, see Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 
1993 (3) SA 738 (W) 740D: “It is common cause that at all material times prior to 23 August 1944, the 
lot from which the respondents’ properties were created by subdivision in later years was landlocked 
in the sense that it was not abutting on any public road.” See further CG van der Merwe “The 
Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 
Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1365. 
3
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 148. 
4
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 147. 
5
Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 148. 
6
 1945 EDL 190. See also AJ Bradbrook “Access to landlocked land: A comparative study of legal 
solutions” (1983) 10 Sydney Law Review 39-60 39. 
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than thirty four years to gain access to a public road,7 and started using a road over 
the defendant’s land.8 The abandoned road reached such a state of disrepair that it 
became practically useless, unless it was repaired at substantial cost.9 The plaintiff 
was left without access to the public road when the defendant eventually refused him 
access over his land.10 Another example is where the dominant owner wilfully 
procures the closing of a public road or abandons an existing servitude of way, 
consequently denying himself access to the public road. A similar situation occurred 
in Riddin v Quinn.11 In that case, the joint owners of a farm subdivided the farm and 
agreed to close all existing private roads.12 Consequently, one of the subdivisions 
was left without direct access to the main road. The defendant subsequently bought 
the subdivision, only to find that it has no access to the public road. A similar 
example is found in Bekker v Van Wyk.13 There, the appellant (dominant owner) and 
his brother jointly procured the closing of a public road which ran over their farms, in 
terms of legislation. Special arrangements were made between the appellant and his 
brother in law, allowing the appellant access over his brother in law’s property, 
without a registered right of way being constituted.14 However, this arrangement 
came to an end when the appellant’s brother in law sold his property to the 
                                            
7
 Rudolph v Casojee 1945 EDL 190 194. 
8
 Rudolph v Casojee 1945 EDL 190 200. 
9
 Rudolph v Casojee 1945 EDL 190 203. 
10
 Rudolph v Casojee 1945 EDL 190 201. 
11
 (1909) 23 EDC 373. 
12
 Riddin v Quinn (1909) 23 EDC 373 375-376. 
13
 1956 (3) SA 13 (T). See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared 
with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1365. 
14
 Bekker v Van Wyk 1956 (3) SA 13 (T) 14. See also JE Scholtens “Law of property (including 
mortgage and pledge); unjust enrichment” 1956 Annual Survey of South African Law 125-153 143. 
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respondents, who subsequent to the purchase closed the appellant’s road by means 
of a fence, thereby denying him access to the public road.15 
Landlocking can also be caused by natural disasters, for instance where 
flooding destroys the road that connects the affected land to the public road.16 
Finally, a change in land use can also result in landlocking, for instance when the 
initial access road is no longer suitable for the new land use, which is what 
happened in Naudé v Ecoman Investment.17 In that case the change in land use, 
from agricultural to public resort, left the initial access road redundant due to the 
heavy traffic the road had to endure for the new use of the dominant land.  
Landlocking has the effect of depriving the landowner of the right to interact 
with the world at large.18 It actually limits his freedom of movement. The owner is 
also barred from the effective exploitation of his land. He is unable to utilize his land 
for the purpose it had been acquired for or is being used for. Consequently, this 
could render the land useless, depreciating in value and causing the dominant owner 
to suffer economic loss. Furthermore, landlocking also causes loss for the public at 
large, who might have benefited from efficient use of the land in the form of job 
creation or production of food and other valuable produce. 
South African property law, more notably servitude law, provides a solution for 
the abovementioned problem. It provides legal relief in the form of the possibility to 
acquire a servitude, in the form of a right of way over the neighbouring land, by 
                                            
15
 Bekker v Van Wyk 1956 (3) SA 13 (T) 14. 
16
 Trautman NO v Poole 1951 (3) SA 200 (C) 202. See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right 
to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 
1363-1413 1365. 
17
 1994 (2) SA 95 (T). 
18
 AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th 
ed 1923) 200. 
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operation of law, in other words without the cooperation of the servient owner and 
even against his will. This servitude is known as the right of way of necessity, also 
referred to as noodweg.19 A right of way of necessity accrues to a landowner, as of 
right, immediately when his land becomes landlocked, leaving him without access or 
reasonably sufficient access to a public road. It binds all the surrounding properties, 
but only one of these properties is directly affected by this servitude once it is 
established. In the absence of agreement between landowners to create a servitude 
that would give the affected land access to the public transport systems, the courts 
have the power to impose this servitude over a specified servient tenement and to 
identify the route that the servitude must follow. It can either be a permanent right of 
way or a temporary right of way, depending on the nature of the landlocking and the 
requirements of the affected landowner. A temporary right of way of necessity is 
usually limited to access in emergency situations. However, this study is limited to a 
permanent right of way of necessity. 
 
1 2 Research question and hypothesis 
The common law pertaining to the right of way of necessity gives courts the authority 
to enforce a servitude of right of way over the identified servient tenement against 
the will of the servient owner. This method of creating a servitude could obviously 
raise constitutional issues, specifically with reference to section 25 of the 
Constitution Republic South Africa 1996 (“the Constitution”), since the servitude is 
not created as usual by negotiation and agreement between the landowners 
involved, but instead by operation of law and court order, without the cooperation of 
the servient landowner and even against his will. Section 25 of the Constitution plays 
                                            
19
 M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 471. 
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a role to the extent that the imposition of a servitude of right of way by operation of 
law affects the servient owner’s property rights to the extent that it brings about a 
forced transfer of rights. Section 25(1) provides that “[n]o one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property”. When the courts by way of court order enforce a 
right of way of necessity against the servient tenement, they place restrictions on 
some of the servient owner’s property rights. The effect of the creation of a right of 
way of necessity by way of court order can be described as a deprivation of the 
servient landowner’s property. Unless there are sufficient reasons justifying this 
infringement of the servient owner’s property rights, the infringement could constitute 
an arbitrary deprivation or even an expropriation of the concerned property rights. 
These effects of the creation of a servitude of right of way have to be analysed and 
explained in terms of section 25. 
Taking into account the manner in which a servitude of way of necessity is 
created, the main question for purposes of this study is whether the creation and 
enforcement of this servitude by the courts amount to a deprivation of the servient 
owner’s property rights, or even an expropriation of such rights, and whether such a 
deprivation or expropriation complies with the requirements in section 25 of the 
Constitution. The assumption on which the study is developed is that the creation of 
this servitude by operation of law may cause a deprivation of the servient owner’s 
property rights and that such deprivation has to be justified in terms of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. Furthermore, it is also assumed that the creation of this servitude 
could even constitute an expropriation of the servient owner’s property rights and 
that such an expropriation has to be justified in terms of section 25(2) and 25(3) of 
the Constitution.  
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As a first step to determining the constitutional validity of the judicial creation of 
the right of way of necessity, this study sets out the background of the law pertaining 
to this servitude. This involves a brief overview of the law regarding the South 
African right of way of necessity and an analysis of the general principles regulating 
this servitude, particularly as they have been developed in case law. Regarding the 
general principles, this study discusses the place of the right of way of necessity in 
servitude law, the creation of the right of way of necessity, the requirements for the 
creation of the right of way of necessity, the conditions for the creation of the right of 
way of necessity, the real nature of this servitude, and finally its termination.  
This study also analyses the rationale for the right of way of necessity and 
specifically the rationale for allowing courts to enforce this servitude. Three 
justifications concerning the right of way of necessity are discussed, namely public 
policy, jurisprudential views, and law and economics theory. 
Finally, this study subjects the common law right of way of necessity to 
constitutional scrutiny. In this regard this study uses the methodology set out in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance (“FNB decision”)20 for resolving constitutional property disputes. In terms of 
this methodology, the first question that has to be asked is whether the creation of a 
servitude of right of way of necessity by way of court order constitutes arbitrary 
deprivation of property. This entails asking the following questions: Firstly, does the 
granting of the right of the right of way of necessity affect property as recognised in 
terms of section 25(1)? This involves defining what property is for purposes of 
section 25. Secondly, does the effect of the creation of this servitude on the said 
                                            
20
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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property rights constitute deprivation as understood by section 25(1)? This entails 
defining the concept of deprivation. Thirdly, if it is established that the rights in 
question constitute property for purposes of section 25, and that the granting of the 
right of way of necessity constitutes deprivation, the question is whether the 
deprivation is in line with section 25(1).  
For a deprivation to be in line with section 25(1), such deprivation must first of 
all be authorised by law of general application. Secondly, such law may not allow 
arbitrary deprivation. Hence it must first be established whether the common law 
regulating the right of way of necessity constitutes law of general application. If it 
does, the second question is whether such law allows arbitrary deprivation. In terms 
of the FNB decision, a deprivation is “arbitrary” in terms of section 25(1) when the 
law complained of “does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in 
question [substantive arbitrariness] or is procedurally unfair [procedural 
arbitrariness]”.21 Regarding procedural arbitrariness, this study raises the question 
whether a deprivation caused by court order can ever be procedurally unfair. As for 
substantive arbitrariness, the central question of the study is whether there is 
sufficient reason to justify the imposition of a servitude of right of way of necessity by 
court order. According to the FNB methodology, a complexity of relationships must 
be analysed in answering this question. The most important question in this regard is 
whether the justifications that have been identified for allowing the courts to establish 
a servitude of right of way by operation of law are sufficient to prevent the deprivation 
from being arbitrary. 
                                            
21
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100.  
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The final question in terms of the FNB methodology is whether the right of way 
of necessity amounts to expropriation contrary to section 25(2). Chapter four briefly 
considers the question whether the common law can authorise an expropriation 
under South African law and concludes that the common law right of way of 
necessity constitutes a deprivation but not an expropriation of property, since in 
South African law there is no authority for expropriation in the absence of legislative 
authority. 
 
1 3 Chapter outline and methodology 
This study consists of five chapters, including the current introductory chapter. 
Chapter two sets out a brief overview of the law concerning the right of way of 
necessity as it has been developed in South African case law. Following the 
overview, the chapter discusses the general principles regulating the right of way of 
necessity, focusing specifically on the principles regarding the creation of this 
servitude, the requirements for the creation of the right of way of necessity, the 
conditions for the creation of the right of way of necessity, the principles regarding 
the registration of limited real rights in land, and the principles concerning termination 
of the right of way of necessity. To achieve the purpose of this chapter, Chapter two 
mainly relies on analysis of case law and academic literature. 
Chapter three investigates and analyses the justifications for the right of way of 
necessity. This chapter investigates both the justifications for recognising the right of 
way of necessity in general and the justifications for allowing courts to enforce this 
servitude against the will of the servient landowner. In this regard, this chapter 
considers public policy arguments, jurisprudential arguments, and law and 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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economics theory relied on in the academic literature22 and case law. Regarding the 
jurisprudential arguments, this study distinguishes between the individualistic 
approach and the social approach. It shows the implications of these approaches for 
the concept of ownership. Furthermore, this study shows the relevance of these 
approaches for current South African case law.  
Chapter four assesses the constitutional validity of the right of way of necessity 
in relation to section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The 
constitutional aspects concern firstly, whether the granting and the enforcement of 
the right of way of necessity amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the servient 
owner’s property rights in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution; secondly, 
whether the creation of this servitude could also amount to an expropriation of 
property rights and, if so, whether the deprivation or expropriation involved is in line 
with section 25 of the Constitution. The chapter relies on the methodology set out in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance (“FNB decision”)23 for resolving constitutional property disputes. The chapter 
considers the justifications identified in chapter three to come to a conclusion 
regarding the possible arbitrariness of the deprivation caused by the imposition of a 
servitude of right of way of necessity. 
The concluding chapter provides an overview of the conclusions drawn from all 
the substantive chapters, and proposes a final conclusion on the question whether 
                                            
22
 Most of the sources cited in this chapter discuss foreign law, specifically the US law regarding the 
public policy arguments on the the right of way of necessity, and also the Dutch law perspective 
concerning the right of way of necessity. The reason for this is that these sources are insightful on the 
justifications for the right of way of necessity, whereas there are relatively few South African academic 
sources that discuss this issue. 
23
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
the right of way of necessity constitutes an arbitrary deprivation or even expropriation 
of the affected servient landowner’s rights. 
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Chapter 2: The law relating to the right of way of necessity 
 
2 1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview on the law relating to the right of way of 
necessity in South African law. The chapter briefly traces the origin of the right of 
way of necessity and discusses the general principles regulating this servitude, 
focusing specifically on the principles regarding praedial servitudes (the place of the 
right of way of necessity in servitude law), principles regarding the establishment (the 
creation) of the right of way of necessity, the requirements for the creation of the 
servitude, the conditions precedent to the establishment of the right of way of 
necessity, the principles regarding the registration of limited real rights in land, and 
the principles concerning termination of the right of way of necessity. For purposes of 
this chapter the landlocked land and the neighbouring land are referred to as the 
dominant tenement and the servient tenement respectively, and their respective 
owners as the dominant owner and the servient owner. Case law and the academic 
literature often refer to this servitude as a ““way of necessity’’ or a “via ex 
necessitate”, however, for purpose of this chapter and the rest of the study it is 
referred to as a “right of way of necessity”. 
 
2 2 The origins of the right of way of necessity 
The origins of the right of way of necessity in South African law can be traced back 
to Wilhelm v Norton.1 This servitude comes from two distinct legal systems and 
                                            
1
 1935 EDL 143. See also CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3
rd
 ed 1973) 76. For a detailed 
discussion on the right of way of necessity, see CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 
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constitutes a hybrid of Roman and Germanic law.2 It originates from Roman law,3  
which acknowledged a right of way to a family grave (iter ad sepulchrum).4 The right 
to a family grave was granted on account of necessity to a person who had a grave 
on his land but no approach to that grave.5 Pomponius is regarded as authority for 
the principle that whenever land on which graves were built had been sold, access to 
such graves as well as to the surrounding spaces must be given to the former 
owners for purposes of funeral processions and the performance of sacrificial rites.6 
Van der Merwe7 shows that Roman law did not only recognise the right to a family 
grave, but, earlier Roman law, also recognised the right of way of necessity for the 
public over private property in cases where the via publica became impassable as a 
result of flooding, and the private right of way of necessity in cases where the 
dominant tenement would otherwise remain undeveloped.8 Germanic law, on the 
                                                                                                                                       
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 
1989) 484-492. See also Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A). 
2
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366, 1367-1368. See also CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 484. 
3
 CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3
rd
 ed 1973) 76; MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of 
rights (2000) 95; CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South 
African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366. See also CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 484-485. 
4
 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 95. See also CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989); CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the 
South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366-1367. 
5
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 152. 
6
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 152. 
7
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367. 
8
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
other hand, recognised a road of egress (uitweg).9 Roman-Dutch law adopted the 
Roman law rule of iter ad sepulchrum together with the Germanic rule of uitweg and 
developed them into a general right of way of necessity.10 It was then extended to all 
lands which had no way out or did not abut on a high road.11 These lands became 
entitled to the right of way of necessity over the servient tenement to enable the 
dominant owner access to the high road by the shortest route and with the least 
damage to the servient tenement.12 The right of way of necessity was received into 
South African law from Roman-Dutch law where it has since been developed to a 
modern legal rule, entitling the owner of an inaccessible piece of land to a right of 
way providing access to a public road over neighbouring land.13  
In the late eighteenth century the Natal government granted the Roads Board 
the power to create ways of necessity over land regardless of the servient owner’s 
consent.14 The power was granted through statutes that were in force at the time and 
this power was finally replaced by the Road Ordinance 40 of 1978.15 Apart from 
                                            
9
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367; CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe 
“Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 111-125 111; CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 484. 
10
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1368. See also MD Southwood The compulsory 
acquisition of rights (2000) 95. 
11
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 152. 
12
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 152. 
13
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367. See also CG van der Merwe “Servitudes 
and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 
598; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 484; WM Gordon & MJ De Waal “Servitudes and real 
burdens” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective 
(2004) 735-757 747; MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 95. 
14
 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 96. 
15
 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 96-97. 
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these statutory developments, case law has since played an important role in the 
development of the law relating to the right of way of necessity.16  
 
2 3 General principles relating to the right of way of necessity 
2 3 1 The place of the right of way of necessity in servitude law 
The right of way of necessity forms part of servitude law. Servitudes are divided into 
two categories, namely personal and praedial servitudes.17 Personal servitudes are 
limited real rights in the movable or immovable property of another, which grant 
entitlements of use and enjoyment over the servient tenement to the servitude 
holders in their personal capacity and not in their capacity as owners of dominant 
tenements.18 Furthermore, personal servitudes cannot exist beyond the life time of 
                                            
16
 The 1979 decision of Van Rensburg v Coetzee1979 (4) SA 655 (A) is a good example of this 
development. The case covered almost all the important aspects of the right of way of necessity. See 
in general the following textbooks where the decision is referred to and discussed: CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 485-491; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 328-330; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM 
Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 247; MD Southwood 
The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 99. 
17
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 321; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 459; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 541; 
CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar 
& J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 237. 
18
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 338; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 506; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W 
Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 237; 
CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 579; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 604. 
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the servitude holders.19 Praedial servitudes, by contrast, are defined as limited real 
rights in the land of someone else, which grant the holders of the servitudes certain 
entitlements of use and enjoyment over the servient tenement in their capacity as 
owners of the dominant tenements.20 In other words, the dominant owner does not 
merely benefit in his personal capacity but as the owner of the dominant tenement.21  
The right of way of necessity forms part of praedial servitudes, also referred to 
as “land-servitudes”22 or “real servitudes”.23 Praedial servitudes are further divided 
into either rural or urban servitudes.24 Rural and urban servitudes are distinguished 
                                            
19
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 322; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 460; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 579; 
CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar 
& J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239. See also Lorentz v Melle 
and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049D: “[a personal servitude,] [n]ormally … terminates (at the 
latest) on the death of the beneficiary (in the case of a natural person).” 
20
 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 545; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 593; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 467; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 322; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J 
van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 237. 
21
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 322; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 459; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W 
Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. 
22
 U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt (translated by P Gane The jurisprudence of my time vol 
1 1939) 323. Huber distinguishes between servitudes over land (rural servitudes) and servitudes over 
a house (urban servitudes). According to him, rural servitudes consist of servitudes of footpath, 
driving cattle, driving vehicles, leading water, discharging water, drawing water, watering cattle or 
grazing them, burning lime, digging sand, gathering and storing fruits, cutting or gathering stone and 
pilling it up, chopping wood, planting huts, boating and fishing on another man’s land.  
23
 M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445. 
24
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 326; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
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from each other by the use which they serve on the land and not on the locality of 
the land.25 Urban servitudes relate to land situated in town or country, with buildings 
primarily used for habitation, commercial, industrial or other related purposes.26 
Rural servitudes, on the contrary, concern those tenements situated in town or 
country and used for agricultural or pastoral purposes.27 Rural servitudes are mainly 
confined to rights of way, servitudes of water and grazing or pasturage servitudes.28 
Although a right of way of necessity falls under rights of way, which generally 
belongs to rural servitudes, a right of way of way of necessity may still fall under 
urban servitudes. The reason for this argument is that the purpose for which the 
                                                                                                                                       
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 554; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 479; CG van 
der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 
(9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 597; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 
186-187; DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en 
advijsen (1894) 423; M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445-457; H Mostert, A 
Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in 
South Africa (2010) 246. 
25
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 326; M Nathan The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 446; AFS Maasdorp The institutes 
of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 186. 
26
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 326; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 554; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 479; AFS 
Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 186; M Nathan The common law 
of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445. 
27
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 326; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 554; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 479; M Nathan 
The common law of South Africa vol 1 (1904) 445-446; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: 
The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 186. 
28
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 326-327; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The 
law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 557; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 479; DP 
de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen (1894) 
423.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
landlocked dominant tenement is used for is irrelevant; the land can be used for 
agricultural, habitation purposes.29 Therefore, depending on the use which the 
dominant tenement is subjected to, a right of way of necessity can either be a rural 
or urban servitude. Like all other praedial servitudes, the right of way of necessity 
must comply with certain requirements necessary for the establishment of valid 
praedial servitudes. What follows is a discussion of the most important requirements 
necessary for the establishment of valid praedial servitudes.  
The right of way of necessity as a praedial servitude must be established in 
respect of two pieces of land, namely, the dominant tenement and the servient 
tenement.30 Both tenements must be owned by different persons, which is in 
accordance with the principle “nemini res sua servit”31 prohibiting an owner from 
having a servitude over his own land.32 Praedial servitudes only exist in respect of 
                                            
29
 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 560. 
30
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 323; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 546; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F 
du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 593; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 469; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van 
Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239, 240. 
31
 This means that nobody can constitute a servitude over his or her own land. See PJ Badenhorst, 
JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 323; H Mostert, 
A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property 
in South Africa (2010) 24; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 592. This principle was also confirmed in 
Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 1993 (3) SA 738 (W) 740F, where the court held 
that it was not only the issue of “no practical need”, but it was also not legally possible to register a 
servitude of way in favour of the lot (dominant tenement) against the adjacent properties belonging to 
one and the same person. 
32
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 323; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 546; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F 
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immovable properties and cannot be established in anything else except in land.33 
The court in Mienie h/a M and J Scrap Metal v Heidebaai Vakansieprojek (Edms) 
Bpk34 refused to recognize a stranded shipwreck as a tenement for purposes of 
allowing a right of way over two adjoining properties to the wreck. The dominant and 
the servient tenement must be neighbouring. This is in accordance to the vicinitas 
principle.35 In terms of this principle, the dominant and servient tenement must be 
situated in the vicinity of each other.36 However, this does not necessarily mean that 
                                                                                                                                       
du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 593; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 468-469; WM Gordon & MJ de Waal “Servitudes and real burdens” in R 
Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (2004) 735-
757 738; AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 161; H Mostert, A 
Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in 
South Africa (2010) 239, 240. See also Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 1993 (3) 
SA 738 (W) 740D.  
33
 CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 592; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar 
& J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 239. See also City Deep v 
Mccalgan 1924 WLD 276 279. 
34
 [1996] 1 All SA 110 (SE) 112: “[T]he Applicant [a scrap metal dealer] had bought the wreck of a 
stranded ship with the intention of cutting it up into pieces and selling the pieces as scrap metal. The 
wreck was lodged in the rocks in such a position that the Applicant had to transport the pieces across 
the farms of the Respondents for part of the way. The Respondents refused to grant permission to the 
Applicant to do this. The Applicant then applied for an order compelling the Respondents to grant him 
a right of way across the relevant portions of their farms”. The court therefore “rejected the Applicant’s 
argument that the wreck could be seen as a landlocked property to which he had no access through 
circumstances beyond his control and therefore needed a right of way thereto”. 
35
 For more on this principle, see JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erfdiensbaarhede” (1990) 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 254-263; JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir 
erfdiensbaarhede” (1990) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 447-464; MJ De Waal “Vicinitas of 
nabuurskap as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1990) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 186-
206. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law 
of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 547; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 471. 
36
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 323; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 547; PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk 
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they must be contiguous or adjoining, but it is required that they be situated so 
closely together that there is a possibility of the servitude affording some benefit to 
the dominant tenement.37 It follows that the right of way of necessity may even be 
established in circumstances where the dominant tenement and the servient 
tenement are separated by intervening properties.38 However, in such a case the 
intervening properties should first be subjected to some kind of servitude or other 
right in order to connect the dominant tenement and the servient tenement,39 which 
need not necessarily be the same servitude to which the servient tenement is 
subjected to.40 
                                                                                                                                       
The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. See also J Scott “The difficult process 
of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-
174 171. 
37
 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 547; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 594; AFS Maasdorp The 
institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 184; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W 
Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240; J 
Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ 
(2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 171; U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt (translated by P Gane 
The jurisprudence of my time vol 1 1939) 330: “In country [rural] servitudes the rule [that tenements 
must be neighbouring or contiguous] is not so strict...”. See also J Scott “The difficult process of 
applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 
171, who seems to be of the view that the landlocked and the servient tenement does not necessarily 
have to be close to each other for the right of way of necessity to be established. 
38
 AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 184-185. See also CG 
van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 
24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk 
The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. 
39
 AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 185. See also CG van 
der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 
(2
nd
 ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk 
The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. 
40
 AFS Maasdorp The institutes of Cape law: The law of things (4
th
 ed 1923) 185; also CG van der 
Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
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The purpose of having the dominant and servient tenement close to each other 
is to enable the servient tenement to afford some benefit to the dominant tenement, 
which is in accordance with the utility (utilitas) requirement.41 In terms of the utility 
requirement, a praedial servitude must offer some permanent benefit to the dominant 
tenement,42 but not just a mere personal benefit to the dominant owner.43 This 
means that a praedial servitude (including a right of way of necessity) must be 
capable of increasing the agricultural, economic, industrial or professional utility of 
the dominant tenement.44 The utility must be capable of being passed from one 
owner to the next upon transfer of the dominant tenement because praedial 
                                                                                                                                       
ed 2010) para 547; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s 
Principles of South African law (9
th
 ed 2007) 591-629 594: “As long as a further servitude is 
established over the intervening tenement.” 
41
 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 547; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & 
J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 240. See also MJ De Waal 
“Vicinitas of nabuurskap as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1990) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 186-206 206, who argues that the vicinity requirement is closely related to the utility 
requirement. On this point, see further
 
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 471.
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 De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998G. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de 
Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 
549; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 323. 
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 De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998G. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de 
Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 
549; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
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servitudes attach to the land and not to the owner in his personal capacity.45 
Furthermore, just like a benefit offered by any praedial servitude, the benefit offered 
by the right of way of necessity must be permanent in nature, which is in accordance 
to the perpetua causa (permanant cause) principle.46 In terms of this principle, the 
use made of the servient tenement must be based on some permanent feature or 
attribute of the servient tenement.47 Therefore, the servient tenement must always be 
capable of continuously satisfying the needs of the dominant tenement (landlocked 
tenement).48 In sum, the right of way of necessity forms part of servitude law and 
specifically belongs under praedial servitudes. The above discussed requirements 
regarding the establishment of praedial servitudes apply in respect of the right of way 
of necessity. 
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2 3 2 Types of right of ways of necessity 
Depending on the nature and the extent of necessity, the dominant owner can claim 
either a permanent right of way (ius via plenum) or a temporary right of way (ius viae 
precario).49 The two differ from one another in that the temporary right of way is 
claimed in emergency situations only or occasionally when necessity requires,50 for 
example in cases of fire, poaching, stock theft or illness of stock51 or during 
harvesting season when existing exits are insufficient to accommodate the urgent 
need of transporting produce to the markets.52 The temporary right of way gives to 
the dominant owner a right to a “short cut” across the servient tenement, whenever 
the existing means of access would not permit him to deal effectively with the 
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emergency in the interest of his farming operations.53 However, this servitude is very 
limited in that the owner of the adjoining property is entitled to close up the road, 
provided he opens it up and allows it to be used when requested in cases of 
emergency.54 The precarious right of way is granted without any monetary 
consideration (compensation).55 On the contrary, a permanent right of way of 
necessity is a permanent and regular means of access over the servient tenement 
and it is granted against payment of reasonable compensation to the servient 
owner.56  
However, this distinction may in the near future fall into disuse because the 
court in Van Rensburg v Coetzee57 questioned the distinction between these two 
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ways of necessity, in particular challenging the relevance of the temporary right of 
way of necessity in light of the characteristics of the modern agricultural industry.58 
For this reason, this chapter and the rest of the study is limited to a permanent right 
of way of necessity. 
 
2 3 3 Constitution of the right way of necessity 
It is important to realise that the right of way of necessity differs from all other 
servitudes in its mode of creation.59 Unlike other servitudes, the right of way of 
necessity is created by operation of law60 as soon as land becomes landlocked. It 
binds the surrounding properties (as of a right)61 immediately when the dominant 
tenement becomes landlocked,62 but only a specific property, amongst the 
surrounding properties, can effectively be burdened with this servitude. Therefore, 
the establishment of a right of way of necessity does not depend on or require the 
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consent of the servient owner whose land is effectively burdened by the servitude.63 
The servitude is imposed against his will.64 In this sense, the servient owner is forced 
by law to allow the dominant owner to have a right of way over the servient 
tenement, which gives the dominant owner access to the public road. This servitude 
can, however, only be effectively assigned to the dominant owner by a court order.65 
In other words, the right of way of necessity may not be exercised without a court 
order.66 However, it is argued that the court order does not establish this servitude 
but only serves to confirm the existence of a right of way of necessity.67 This 
confirms the argument that this servitude is created by operation of law immediately 
when the dominant tenement becomes landlocked. In essence the court order 
merely serves to provide for the enforcement of the right by allocating and defining a 
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particular route upon which the right is to be exercised,68 without which the right may 
not be exercised. Therefore, a distinction should be drawn between the 
establishment of the general right by law and the actual enforcement of the right by 
courts. The right is established by operation of law, while the way along which the 
right may be exercised is granted by order of court to give effect to the right. The 
essence is that the right of way of necessity precedes a court order that declares its 
existence and exercise. This distinction is influenced by the views of Scholtens69 and 
Van der Merwe.70 According to Scholtens the right of way of necessity is constituted 
by operation of law and only the route used in exercise of the right is established by 
the court or by agreement between the parties.71 For Van der Merwe the right of way 
of necessity automatically burdens the neighbouring tenements and that an 
agreement or a court order only serves to give a declaratory effect to the right.72 
Therefore, it can be argued that where the landlocked dominant owner acquires from 
the servient owner a negotiated right of way, without the interventions of the courts, 
such a servitude cannot qualify as a right of way of necessity but an ordinary right of 
way.  
The court order declaring the right of way of necessity and determining the way 
can either be obtained from a magistrate’s court, in terms of section 29(1)(c) of the 
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Magistrates’ Courts Act,73 or from the High Court.74 Both courts have the jurisdiction 
to deal with cases concerning the right of way of necessity, and such jurisdiction 
includes the power to order the registration of the right of way of necessity, 75 and the 
power to grant an interim right of way of necessity pending the determination of an 
action to register the servitude,76 as was confirmed in Cloete v Karee-Aar Landgoed 
Bpk.77 In that case, the appellant (dominant owner), a farm owner who had no 
access to a public road, instituted an action against the respondent (the servient 
owner) of an adjoining farm in which he sought the registration of a right of way of 
necessity over the respondent’s farm.78 Pending the determination of that action, the 
dominant owner sought an urgent interdict for an interim right of way of necessity.79 
In the latter proceedings the servient owner successfully raised an argument that the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act80 did not make provision for such interim relief and the court 
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dismissed the application. The dominant owner appealed against the decision.81 The 
issue on appeal was whether a Magistrates’ Court had jurisdiction to grant an interim 
interdict in respect of the right of way of necessity.82 After considering the provisions 
of section 29(1)(c) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act83 concerning the jurisdiction of the 
Magistrates Courts, the court held that this provision, read together with section 30 of 
the same Act, includes an interim order in respect of a right of way as well as the 
right of way of necessity84 and therefore upheld the appeal.85 
Another interesting aspect to consider is whether the dominant owner is under 
a duty to first try and negotiate for a right of way with the servient owner before he 
(dominant owner) can approach the court for an order declaring his right of way of 
necessity enforceable. It appears that this question has never been considered 
explicitly in South African law. Only the case of Wilhelm v Norton86 discussed the 
position in Roman law regarding the duty to negotiate. It was held in Wilhelm v 
Norton that in Roman law, before the dominant owner could claim a servitus 
necessaria (servitude of necessity) from the court, he had an obligation to first try 
and negotiate with the servient owner for an ordinary servitude of way.87 The court 
could only be approached for assistance after all attempts to reach an agreement 
have failed, and the servient owner had refused to recognise the friendly request by 
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the dominant owner.88 Although there is no specific requirement in South African law 
for parties to first negotiate between themselves before bringing a claim for the right 
of way of necessity before the court, it appears that most of the cases are only 
brought to court following unsuccessful negotiations between parties. On this note, it 
can be argued that the dominant owner has a duty to first negotiate for a right of 
way, with the servient owner, before approaching the court for an order declaring the 
right of way of necessity enforceable. The reason for this argument is that the duty to 
negotiate enables the dominant owner to satisfy the necessity requirement, which is 
a requirement in a claim for a right of way of necessity. 
 
2 3 4 Requirements for the acquisition of the right of way of necessity 
2 3 4 1 Introduction 
There are certain requirements which the dominant owner must establish in a claim 
for a permanent right of way of necessity, and these requirements were expressly 
mentioned in passing in Van Rensburg v Coetzee.89 In that case, the Appellate 
Division stated that the dominant owner must establish the “particular necessity.”90 
This must prove the necessity to have a right of way. Furthermore, the court also 
stated that the dominant owner must also establish the reason why the right of way 
                                            
88
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 175. See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced 
passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 
1367. 
89
 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 678A. 
90
 Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 678A. See also a case note by CG van der Merwe 
“Law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1979 Annual Survey of South African Law 217-257 
244. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
of necessity should traverse the servient owner’s land.91 This could be interpreted to 
mean that the dominant owner is required to establish that his property is landlocked 
to the extent that it lacks connection or sufficient connection to a public road, and 
that the particular servient land is a suitable land by which he can gain access to a 
public road.92 In other words the dominant owner must establish that his property is 
landlocked. On that note, it can be argued that for the dominant owner to succeed on 
a claim for a right of way of necessity, his property must be “landlocked”. 
Furthermore, it must be landlocked in such a manner that it is “necessary” for him to 
obtain a right of way of necessity over a particular servient tenement. The necessity 
and landlocking requirements are discussed in detail below. However, neither the 
courts nor legal writers expressly refer to these two as requirements for purposes of 
a claim of the right of way of necessity.93  
 
2 3 4 2 Landlocking 
In principle, the dominant tenement must be landlocked for the dominant owner to be 
entitled to a claim for a right of way of necessity. Considering the hybrid nature of the 
South African law on the right of way of necessity, landlocking includes complete 
landlocking without access to public transport systems, which is more of a strict 
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approach,94 and also landlocking in the sense that the dominant tenement does have 
an access to public transport systems but such access is not sufficient for the proper 
exploitation and economic development of the landlocked dominant tenement. 95 The 
latter is more of a flexible approach. The flexible approach has become more 
prevalent in case law. The court in Sanders NO and Another v Edwards NO and 
Others (Sanders case) 96 also held that the dominant tenement does not have to be 
literally landlocked from the public road, but it should “constructively” constitute a 
“blokland”.97  
In Van Schalkwijk v Du Plessis and Others,98 the court held that cases may 
arise in which the alternative route would be so difficult and inconvenient as to be 
practically impossible, and such cases may justify the granting of the right of way of 
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necessity. In English v C J M Harmse Investments,99 Hurt J referred to Van der 
Merwe and Lubbe100 and stated that: 
“The authors [Lubbe and van der Merwe] dealt with a number of decisions prior 
to 1977 in which the Courts granted rights of way to properties which were not 
actually landlocked but where the existing means of access to public roads or 
railway sidings were unduly complicated.”101 
A claim for a right of way of necessity may therefore still arise where the dominant 
tenement has existing access, but the access is unsuitable for the owner’s proposed 
use or for the optimal exploitation of the dominant tenement,102 like in the Sanders 
case,103 where the court granted a way of necessity where only a part of the land 
was landlocked. In that case the dominant owners (respondents) had access to the 
public road through the northern part of their land. However, the dominant owners 
sought access to another public road over the servient owners’ (appellants’) land to 
connect to the southern part of the dominant land where they planned on conducting 
extensive protea farming operations. The court, with reference to the decisions of 
Trautman NO v Poole104 and Natal Parks, Game and Fish Preservation Board v 
Maritz,105 extended the scope of a right of way of necessity to cover instances where 
property is effectively cut in two, holding that it may be necessary in such instances 
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for each half to have its own right of way to a public road.106 According to the court 
the law could not be so lacking in common sense as to deny a way of necessity in 
the circumstances.107 On that basis, the court concluded that the dominant owners 
are entitled to the access sought despite them having alternative access.108 Courts 
have also granted a right of way of necessity to the dominant owner because the 
alternative way was very long,109 tortuous110 or over difficult terrain.111 However, the 
right of way of necessity cannot be claimed based on the mere fact that an existing 
route is simply longer or more inconvenient than the way sought.112 Convenience is 
not the basis for the claim of a right way of necessity.113 Furthermore, the right of 
way of necessity cannot be claimed merely on the basis that the servient tenement 
alone separates the dominant tenement from the public road, if the dominant 
tenement already has access to the public road (by agreement) by a route passing 
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over one or more intervening properties whose owners have raised no objections to 
its use.114 In such instances the dominant owner has no claim for a right way of 
necessity until the contractual right of way has been revoked by the servient 
owner.115 In sum, a right of way of necessity could be granted in instances where the 
dominant tenement is geographically landlocked, that is where the land is totally 
landlocked or landlocked in a way that an alternative way is available for the 
dominant tenement but it is inadequate to enable the dominant owner reasonable 
access to a public road.116 
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2 3 4 3 Necessity 
As already stated above, necessity is an important requirement for purposes of 
claiming a right of way of necessity.117 In Van Rensburg v Coetzee,118 the court 
recommended that the dominant owner should allege and establish the particular 
necessity.119 “Necessity” is said to be interpreted strictly.120 In Holland no owner of 
land could obtain a right of way of necessity to a public road across the servient 
tenement if he had convenient access to public water.121 This was also applied in 
cases of subdivision, where the back portion had a right of way over the portion 
fronting the road, but the back portion was so situated that it had an outlet by 
water.122 These principles can no longer find obvious application in South African 
law, given the different circumstances.  
In principle, the right of way of necessity cannot be claimed further than the 
actual necessity of the case.123 In essence, it can only be claimed when necessity 
demands it.124 The right of way of necessity is awarded on the basis of what is 
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necessary and not merely what is reasonably required.125 It is unclear what 
constitutes necessity, as there is no definite rule in our law to determine the 
circumstances that would constitute necessity,126 as was confirmed in Trautman v 
Poole.127 In that case, Steyn J stated that the court had the opportunity to consider 
the circumstances which would justify the grant of the right of way of necessity,128 
but refrained from doing so: 
“the Court has never laid down any definite rule as to what circumstances would 
constitute such a necessity, nor is it advisable that such a rule should now be 
laid down.”129 
The test is necessity and not even great inconvenience is sufficient to justify the 
granting of a way of necessity.130 According to Nugent JA in Aventura v Jackson,131 
necessity means that the right of way must be the only reasonable sufficient means 
of gaining access to the landlocked tenement but not just a convenience means of 
doing so.132 Maasdorp states that the right of way of necessity is limited to the 
absolute necessity of the case.133 However, he goes further to qualify this argument 
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by stating that the term “absolute necessity” does not necessarily mean there can be 
no way of necessity over a servient tenement, except where such a way is the only 
connection to the public road.134  
It can be argued that necessity is also dependent on the use of the dominant 
tenement. Accordingly, as stated above,135 a situation of necessity may still arise in 
instances where the dominant tenement has an existing access but, due to the 
unsuitability of such access to the purpose of use of the dominant tenement 
alternative access is necessary. This confirms Nugent JA’s definition of necessity in 
Aventura v Jackson.136 According to Nugent JA necessity means that the right of 
way must be the only reasonably sufficient means of gaining access to the 
landlocked tenement but not just a convenient means of doing so.137 Therefore, 
absolute necessity is not the sole basis upon which a right of way of necessity can 
be granted.138 Courts go beyond absolute necessity.139 The courts, when deciding on 
the issue of necessity, have to strike a balance of convenience, that is weighing the 
balance between the inconvenience suffered by the owner of the dominant tenement 
without access and the inconvenience that the right of way will cause for the servient 
owner, with due regard to the nature of the servient tenement and its use.140 For 
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instance, in the Sanders case141 the topography of the dominant owners’ property 
included steep slopes and a ravine which was impassable in wet weather conditions, 
making the cost of construction of the existing road (a road necessary for the 
dominant owner’s proposed farming operations) more expensive. The court 
accepted that the expenditure would have the effect of making the proposed farming 
operations uneconomical142 and held that the proposed right of way of necessity 
would provide a more feasible solution and cause minimal inconvenience to the 
servient owner.143  
A similar decision was reached in Illing v Woodhouse.144 There, the court held, 
considering the distance that the dominant owner had to travel and the cost involved 
to reach the alternative railway station as compared to the distance and cost to the 
proposed railway station, that the necessities of the dominant owner’s farming 
operations were so reasonable that he should have access to the nearest railway 
station via the road claimed.145 In this case the dominant owner (the applicant - a 
farm owner) had to travel about 2,000 miles more to the alternative railway station to 
transport his farm produce, compared to the much shorter claimed road to the 
intended railway station. This had the consequence of more expensive transport 
costs, excluding the extra time that had to be occupied in deliveries to the station.146 
It is clear from these two judgements that the right of way of necessity can be 
granted in view of the dominant owner’s necessity of conducting economically viable 
farming operations. On the basis of the “balance of convenience” principle, the right 
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of way of necessity is likely to be granted to the dominant owner where the cost 
involved in the use of an alternative road would economically inconvenience the 
owner in his farming operations far more than the minimal inconvenience that would 
be occasioned to the servient owner by the proposed right of way.147  
However, the court may refuse to grant the right of way of necessity where the 
prejudice to be suffered by the servient owner far more exceed the prejudice to be 
suffered by the dominant owner without access.148 Again, it is not admissible for the 
dominant owner to claim the right of way of necessity over the servient tenement if 
he already enjoys access to the public road via an existing road over neighbouring 
properties which he uses without objection.149 Furthermore, the dominant tenement 
cannot claim the right of way of necessity to the best and nearest public road over 
the servient tenement in circumstances where he already has a road that is more 
circuitous or less convenient but still reasonable.150 The onus is on the dominant 
owner to prove the necessity of the servitude sought,151 proving, for instance, that it 
is necessary for the purpose of conducting viable farming operations.152 The 
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necessity for having the right of way can also be proved by showing the impossibility 
to obtain a negotiated right of way.153  
Self-created necessity does not entitle the dominant owner to claim the right of 
way of necessity. This includes landlocking that results from voluntary conduct or 
negligence of the dominant owner.154 This is in accordance with the principle that the 
owner who has only himself to blame for the enclosure cannot claim a right of way of 
necessity.155 Although it has been argued that this principle finds no basis in Roman-
Dutch law,156 the principle has been applied successfully in South African case law, 
and most authors also recognise this principle, arguing that a right of way of 
necessity cannot be claimed by an owner who has through his own fault, design or 
negligence cut his land off from access to a public road.157 According to Dowling J in 
Bekker v Van Wyk,158 the authority for this principle can be traced back to Ross’ 
Executors v Ritchie.159 Dowling J held that this principle was introduced to prevent 
the dominant owner from placing himself in a position where he could “virtually 
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expropriate some of his neighbour's real rights”.160 For instance, if the dominant 
owner whose property borders on the main street builds on the whole of his street 
frontage, thereby blocking his access to the main street, he caused the lack of 
access through his own action.161 Again, the dominant owner who voluntarily or 
negligently abandons an existing way which gives him access to the public road;162 
voluntarily takes part in securing the closure of a public road that he benefits from;163 
or closes a private road which connects him to a public road164 places himself in a 
similar position.  
This principle has been considered and applied in a number of decisions,165 at 
the same time; however, courts have in certain instances ignored the principle. For 
instance, in Illing v Woodhouse the court granted the right of way of necessity 
despite the dominant owner’s contribution to the situation of necessity.166 Following 
the dominant owner’s relocation of his farmstead from the southern part to the 
northern part of the farm, the existing access to the public road from the southern 
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part of the farm became unsuitable for the dominant owner’s farming operations.167 A 
similar approach was followed in Naude v Ecoman Investments en Andere.168 In that 
case the dominant owner successfully acquired a right of way of necessity over the 
servient owner’s land following his own decision to change the land use from 
agricultural to tourism. The same approach was also followed in SA Yster en Staal 
Industriële Korporasie Bpk v Van der Merwe.169 In that case, the dominant owner 
(appellant) and the servient owner (respondent) concluded a temporary agreement 
permitting the dominant owner to construct and use a road over the servient owner’s 
land. Following an unsuccessful attempt to acquire a permanent right of way over the 
road from the servient owner, the dominant owner terminated the agreement, leaving 
himself without access, and applied to the court for an order granting him a right of 
way of necessity over the servient tenement. The Appellate Division found that the 
dominant owner would have been entitled to a way of necessity even before he 
concluded the agreement with the servient owner and also found that the terms of 
the agreement and preceding circumstances did not contain anything amounting to a 
waiver of the dominant owner`s rights to claim a way of necessity. The court also 
found that the agreement was intended to be a temporary one and therefore held 
that the dominant owner’s decision to terminate the agreement did not bar him from 
claiming the right of way of necessity. According to Van der Merwe, this approach is 
mostly aimed at encouraging the efficient economic exploration of the dominant 
tenement.170 
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A similar principle is found in subdivision of land cases, specifically in instances 
where parties to the subdivision failed to make provision for a servitude of right of 
way in favour of one of the portions that has become enclosed. In these instances 
the enclosed portion may not seek a right of way anywhere else but over the other 
portion. This principle entails that the owner who acquires the back portion that has 
no outlet retains his right of outlet over the front portion, even though nothing was 
said about this at the time of the sale agreement.171 This was confirmed in Van 
Rensburg v Coetzee,172 where the Appellate Division held that in cases of 
subdivision of land a right of way is conferred by tacit agreement. In other words, the 
right of way is implied over the front portion (implied consent). Therefore, the 
dominant owner may not acquire a right of way of necessity over neighbouring 
properties. The reason for this principle is that the splitting of the land cannot impose 
a servitude upon the neighbours173 and that it is against equity for the seller of 
partitioned land to refuse proper access (over his front portion), thereby attempting to 
impose an improper burden upon his neighbours.174 However, this principle was 
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rejected by Kennedy J in Matthews v Road Board for the District of Richmond and 
Others,175 the court stating that 
“what van Leeuwen there had to say is but of small practical value in a country 
like South Africa where vast tracts of land, as we know, exist for farming 
purposes; it would be impractical; from the distance point of view alone, if any 
such an owner sub-divided his land, to compel the owner of the sub-division to 
use the right of way enjoyed by the seller, and none other, when a closer and 
more reasonable means of access is available by the grant of a way of necessity 
over a neighbour's property.” 
These principles bind the dominant owner’s successors in title because their right to 
a way of necessity depends upon those of their predecessors in title.176 For instance, 
if the dominant owner’s predecessor in title abandoned a right of way giving access 
to a public road, the succeeding dominant owners will be bound by such decision 
and therefore will not be entitled to a way of necessity. Again, subdivision cases may 
prevent the dominant owner from claiming a right of necessity from the surrounding 
properties. Nevertheless, these principles are in certain instances qualified. 
 
2 3 5 Conditions attached to a right of way of necessity 
2 3 5 1 Introduction 
The Court in Van Rensburg v Coetzee177 suggested in passing that the dominant 
owner must take the following aspects into consideration in a claim for a permanent 
right of way of necessity. The dominant owner must state the width of the road he 
claims, together with the grounds upon which that claim is founded, and he should 
                                            
175
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also indicate a particular route for the court’s consideration;178 and he should offer an 
amount of compensation for the court’s consideration.179 It may be argued that the 
abovementioned aspects are conditions precedent the exercise of a right of way of 
necessity, and for the purposes of this section they are referred to as “conditions” 
attached to a right of way of necessity. However, neither the courts nor legal writers 
refer to these factors as conditions. They are relevant as soon as the two main 
requirements have been successfully established.  
 
2 3 5 2 The route 
In the event the dominant owner is to succeed in his claim for a right of way of 
necessity over a particular servient tenement, then the next step is to determine the 
route over the servient tenement that a right of way of necessity must traverse.180 In 
doing so, the courts are guided by the principle “ter naaste lage en minster schade” 
or the shortest route that causes the lightest burden for the servient tenement.181 
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This means that a right of way of necessity must traverse an adjoining servient 
tenement that lies between the landlocked land and the nearest public road along a 
route over the servient tenement which causes the smallest amount of damage to 
the servient tenement.182  
The principle is, however, not absolute.183 It can be departed from where it is 
foreseen that the identified servient tenement, which a right of way of necessity must 
traverse is so impassable that it provides no practical way out or if the identified 
servient tenement would be detrimentally affected by the proposed way.184 In such 
circumstances another plan would have to be found.185 It was decided in Jackson v 
Aventura Ltd186 that the environmental and engineering implications which may arise 
as a result of the exercise of the right of way of necessity ought not to serve as a 
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defence for avoiding application of the principle. In other words, such factors ought 
not to be taken into consideration in an action for the possible acquisition of a right of 
way of necessity.187 The court held that its duty was to decide the matter in 
accordance to the principles of the common law (in that case the common principle 
of ter naaster lage en minster schade) reserving the environmental aspect to the 
relevant legislative authorities.188 The shortest route principle does not necessarily 
entitle the dominant owner to insist on using the shortest route over the servient 
tenement.189 This is because access over the servient tenement to the nearest main 
road does not mean the shortest possible “cut” from the dominant tenement to the 
nearest main road;190 it must be the least burdensome and nearest route to the 
public road, seen from the perspective of the servient tenement.191  
In principle the size of the route required for the exercise of the right of way of 
necessity depends on the needs of the dominant tenement.192 However, in the 
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absence of evidence to substantiate the need, the common law rules will apply.193 
The common law rules entail that the road must follow the boundaries of the servient 
tenement as far as possible, rather than to cut through it unnecessarily.194 The width 
of the road is fixed at eight feet in common law.195 Other than that, the dominant 
owner, in his claim for a permanent right of way of necessity, who requires a wider 
route than is allowed for in common law, will have to prove the need for such a 
route.196 However, the dominant owner should indicate a suitable route if the servient 
owner disputes its suitability, unless he relies on the common-law rule that the road 
must follow the boundary.197 This, however, does not often happen in practice 
because if the servient owner disputes the suitability of the route claimed by the 
dominant owner and fails to indicate an alternative route, the prima facie 
“reasonable” choice of the dominant owner will be decisive.198 Generally, the right of 
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way of necessity is created simpliciter,199 and therefore, a route over which the right 
is exercised could be altered by the servient owner if he can afford to the dominant 
owner another route as convenient as the first route.200 The altering cannot 
constitute a dispossession provided it is reasonable and does not prejudice the 
dominant owner.201 The right of way of necessity can only be established along a 
specified or defined route if such a route is constituted by an order of court or by 
prescription.202 Basically, a distinction is made between an application de servitute 
constituenda and an application de servitute constituta.203 The former entails an 
application for a declaration of a general right of way of necessity; and the latter, 
entails an application for a specific route for the purpose of exercising the right of 
way of necessity.204 It is not clear as to whether a specified right of way of necessity 
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can also be relocated like any ordinary right of way. Van der Merwe, however, simply 
argues that the principles governing the relocation of a right of way of necessity 
differs from the ones governing relocation of ordinary rights of way.205 In the event it 
is possible to relocate a specified right of way of necessity, then one can infer that 
such relocation should be done following the guideline principles laid down in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another.206 
In terms of that decision, the relocation of a specified servitude (ordinary servitude) 
can only be allowed if the servient owner is materially inconvenienced in the use of 
the servient tenement by the continued existence of the established route; the 
dominant owner would not be prejudiced by the relocation; and provided the costs of 
such relocation are borne by the servient owner.207 One can add that relocation of a 
specified right of way of necessity may further require from the servient owner a 
court order allowing the relocation. 
Like in the exercise of any ordinary servitude, the dominant owner likewise in 
the exercise of a right of way of necessity, over a particular route, must exercise 
such right with due regard for the servient owner’s rights so as to cause the least 
inconvenience to the servient owner (the so-called civiliter modo principle).208 
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Furthermore, the dominant owner also has a duty to repair and maintain the route 
over which he exercise his right of way, and should he allow such a route to become 
so eroded that he can no longer use it, he, including his successors in title, cannot 
claim a new way of necessity from his neighbours.209 
 
2 3 5 3 Public road  
In principle, a right of way of necessity is claimed for the purpose of connecting the 
dominant tenement with a public road.210 Therefore, the dominant owner must 
establish that the road that he seeks connection to is indeed a public road.211 South 
African law has always recognised two kinds of public roads,212 namely the high 
roads (viae publicae) and neighbours’ roads, otherwise called sufferance roads (viae 
                                                                                                                                       
Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of 
property in South Africa (2010) 245. Regarding the correct meaning of the concept civiliter modo, see 
J Scott “A growing trend in source application by our courts illustrated by a recent judgment on right of 
way” (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 239-251 242-243 points out that in 
modern South African servitude law the Latin phrase civiliter modo is consistently read as a set of 
adverbs that qualify the conduct of the servitude holder, so that a servitude holder who acts 
reasonably is said to be acting in a civilised (civiliter) manner (modo). Scott points out that the word 
modo, particularly when used together with dum, means ‘so long as’ or ‘provided that’, with the effect 
that the phrase civiliter modo in D 8.1.9 (more fully dum modo civilier servitutem exerceat) means 
“provided that he exercise the servitude with due regard for the other party”. Scott at 243 accepts that 
“the popular erroneous translation acts as a handy shorthand” for the longer phrase and will therefore 
probably survive. 
209
 Rudolph v Casojee 1945 EDL 190 194. 
210
 S van Leeuwen Het Roomsch Hollandsch recht (1783 edited and translated by CW Decker & JG 
Kotzé Commentaries on Roman-Dutch law 2
nd
 ed 1921) 295 para 7. 
211
 Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143 156. 
212
 DP de Bruyn The opinions of Grotius as contained in the Hollandsche consultatien en advijsen 
(1894) 425. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
vicinales).213 The former are constituted and declared as public roads by the relevant 
authorities214 and maintained at public expense.215 Public roads, in general, can be 
regarded as those roads that are there for the use by the public at large,216 and they 
can be classified either as proclaimed or unproclaimed roads.217 The former are 
further divided into main roads and divisional roads and they are proclaimed as such 
by the relevant authorities.218 
Sufferance roads are roads that generally had been made by private persons 
over their own land,219 leading to a town or village that had been used by others from 
time immemorial.220 Through lapse of time the original purpose and institution of 
these roads were forgotten and their use became so common that almost all the 
roads had to be kept in repair and they ended up being regarded as public roads.221 
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Sufferance roads were also regarded as public roads if they were on private property 
and repaired by private individuals.222 For a sufferance road to be deemed a public 
road Roman law required it to have been built by contributions from private 
individuals.223 However, an exception applied if the road had been in existence since 
time immemorial.224 If a land owner allows public money to be spent on his private 
road it could be assumed that he had dedicated such a road to the public.225  
Legislation was introduced to regulate matters relating to public roads.226 These 
included the classification, definition, construction, repair and maintenance of such 
roads.227 Some of the earlier road legislation defined a public road as 
“Every road, not being a proclaimed road, over which a right of way exists in 
favour of the public and which is or may be constructed for the use of wheeled 
vehicles.”228  
The current National Road Traffic Act defines a public road as 
“any road, street or thoroughfare or any other place (whether a thoroughfare or 
not) which is commonly used by the public or any section thereof or to which the 
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public or any section thereof has a right of access, and includes the verge of any 
such road, street or thoroughfare-, any bridge, ferry or drift traversed by any such 
road, street or thoroughfare; and any other work or object forming part of or 
connected with or belonging to such road, street or thoroughfare.”229  
From the above, it is clear that the dominant owner must prove that the alleged 
public road that he seeks connection to is a public road recognised by law.  
The above discussion on the need to prove that a way of necessity would 
provide access to a public road gives rise to two interesting questions. Firstly, it is 
unclear whether a claim for a right of way of necessity is only limited to connecting 
the landlocked land to a single transport system, namely public road.230 Secondly, it 
is unclear whether such a claim for a right of way of necessity is limited to connecting 
the landlocked dominant tenement to public transport systems or it can also be given 
for any other purpose.231 
Regarding the first question, in principle a right of way of necessity is mainly 
associated with connecting the dominant tenement to a public road. It is unclear 
whether this servitude can also be granted to connect the dominant tenement to 
other transport systems. Southwood argues that the institutional writers, with the 
exception of Van Leeuwen, seem not to recognise any other transport system except 
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for public roads for the purposes of the right of way of necessity.232 He argues that 
only Van Leeuwen recognised a right of way of necessity connecting a dominant 
tenement to public water.233 Van der Merwe also argues that waterways might have 
played an important role in Holland during the seventeenth and eighteenth century in 
providing connection for landlocked properties.234 Access to waterways is however, 
of little practical importance in South Africa, taking into account the country’s “ totally 
different traffic conditions”, where there is only one navigable river found in the 
Eastern Cape.235 
The Natal government recognised railways for the purposes of granting a right 
of way of necessity under its legislation,236 which gave the Road Board the power to 
create such ways of necessity.237 In Illing v Woodhouse,238 the applicant claimed a 
way of necessity to a railway station and the court referred to section 17(b) of Road 
Board Act 35 of 1901, which reads as follows: 
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(2000) 96 fn 11. 
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“The expression ‘by-road’ as used in this Act means: ... (b) A way of necessity, 
including a reasonably necessary means of access to a public road or a railway 
station, stopping place or siding.” 
Despite the provision being criticised for being in conflict with the original common 
law principle of the right of way of necessity,239 the court reached the conclusion that 
the law also recognised access to a railway station240 and held that the applicant was 
therefore entitled to a reasonable necessary means of access to the station.241  
The Board’s powers to create such ways of necessity were finally taken away 
by the Road Ordinance 40 of 1978 (N)242 and it appears that no cases have 
subsequently been reported concerning claims for a right of way of necessity to 
connect the dominant tenement to a railway transport system. It is argued that cases 
dealing with a right of way of necessity connecting landlocked land to other public 
transport systems are not in accordance with common law.243 However, the fact that 
the institutional writers did not recognise other forms of public transport systems for 
the purposes of granting the right of way of necessity, and the fact that our legal 
system has always discussed a right of way of necessity in the context of public 
roads244 does not necessarily mean that our courts should not consider them. Van 
der Merwe argues that a right of way of necessity should be granted considering the 
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needs of the landlocked dominant tenement irrespective of the mode of transport 
facility that the landlocked land is sought to be connected with.245 It is therefore 
necessary for courts to take into account modern developments when deciding 
cases regarding the grant of right of way of necessity. One can agree with 
Southwood, who is of the view that courts are likely to grant a right of way of 
necessity connecting the dominant tenement to other public transport systems.246 
Southwood argues that there were no trains and airplanes in the 1600s.247 It can 
therefore be argued that the mere fact that these transport systems did not exist at 
the time when the right of way of necessity was in force should not serve as a bar for 
recognising other forms of public transport systems for the purposes of granting the 
right of way of necessity. It is further argued that the application of an extension of 
the right of way of necessity to other forms of traffic facilities, particularly where the 
dominant owner has access to a public road, can be justified by the use of the 
dominant tenement, for instance its agricultural operations.248 
Regarding the second question, South African case law has considered this 
question on numerous occasions, asking whether the aim of the right of way of 
necessity is limited to giving the dominant tenement access to public roads (public 
transport system).249 In Trautman NO v Poole,250 the court was faced with a similar 
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question, namely whether the right of way of necessity could be granted over the 
servient tenement to enable the dominant owner to proceed to any other parts of his 
own property.251 Steyn J could not find any authority under Roman-Dutch law to this 
effect, but assumed that the right of way of necessity could be granted under such 
circumstances.252 A similar question arose in Natal Parks, Game and Fish 
Preservation Board v Maritz.253 In that case the court had to decide whether the right 
of way of necessity was limited to a connection to a public road.254 A portion of a 
game reserve was cut off from the remainder by a steep and deep gully,255 making it 
difficult to reach.256 Following numerous incidences of poaching, the appellant 
constructed a vehicle track in the reserve with the purpose of facilitating control of 
poachers, including trespassers and fire incidence.257 However, this security 
measure could not be implemented on the cut-off portion due to the difficulty in 
question,258 and as a result of this, poaching incidences escalated on that portion.259 
The appellant, the Natal Parks Board, therefore applied for a right of way of 
necessity over the respondent’s property, to connect the cut-off portion with the 
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remainder portion with the aim of establishing a ranger’s station.260 The respondent 
contended that the proposed way did not qualify as a common law right of way of 
necessity261 for the reason that the dominant tenement was not landlocked and, 
most importantly, that the way was not sought to connect to the public road but for 
connecting the two portions with the aim of preventing poaching.262 The court held 
that a right of way of necessity can also be granted for any other necessary purpose 
other than connecting the dominant tenement to a public road, dismissing the view in 
Trautman NO v Poole263 that common law does not recognise such.264 The court 
reached the conclusion that a necessary detour connecting the cut-off portion with 
the remainder of the reserve qualified as a justification for granting a right of way of 
necessity.265 
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Therefore, an argument can be made, on the strength of the above discussion 
that a right of way of necessity may be granted for any other necessary purpose than 
just connection to public transport systems.266 Van der Merwe argues that this 
extension accords with the interests of society.267 This extension also resemble the 
position in Louisiana, which shares the same Roman roots on a right of way of 
necessity with South African law.268 The Louisiana Civil Code provides that a right of 
way of necessity can also be granted for the purpose of connecting the dominant 
tenement to public utilities,269 such as electricity, water, sewer, gas, telephone, cable 
television, and other commonly used power and communication networks required 
for the operation of an ordinary household or business.270 
 
2 3 5 4 The relevance of the use of the dominant tenement 
This section partly overlaps with the previous section although this one is mainly 
concerned with the question whether the granting of a right of way of necessity is 
restricted to land used for agricultural purposes. There are mixed views on this 
aspect. The Appellate Division in the Van Rensburg case could have easily cleared 
this uncertainty but according to Southwood it did not have to do so for the reason 
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that the claimant in that case was a farmer.271 There are divided views on this 
aspect. Some authorities argue that a right of way of necessity is mainly used in 
cases involving rural land used for agricultural purposes, whereas others argue that 
the purpose for which the land is used is irrelevant. 
Huber272 argues that neighbours are bound to allow the right of way of 
necessity for the sake of “saving agriculture”. Steyn J in Trautman v Poole273 held 
that the right of way of necessity is limited to the necessity of the owner`s farming 
operations.274 According to Steyn J there was no authority that allows the right of 
way of necessity for the purpose of allowing the public to use a specific portion of the 
dominant owner`s farm for camping purposes.275 In Beukes v Crous en ’n Ander,276 
the court held that the owner of inaccessible land cannot make the burden on the 
servient tenement heavier by extending his activities to commercial or mining 
undertakings.277 In Natal Parks, Game and Fish Preservation Board v Maritz,278 
Holmes J took a slight turn, holding that: 
                                            
271
 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 100. 
272
 U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt (translated by P Gane The jurisprudence of my time vol 
1 1939) 330. See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the 
South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1382. 
273
 1951 (3) SA 200 (C). 
274
 Trautman NO v Poole 1951 (3) SA 200 (C) 207.  
275
 Trautman NO v Poole 1951 (3) SA 200 (C) 207. 
276
 1975 (4) SA 215 (NC). 
277
 Beukes v Crous en ’n Ander 1975 (4) SA 215 (NC) 221. See also CG van der Merwe “The 
Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 
Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1391. 
278
 1958 (4) SA 545 (N). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
“A way of necessity can be granted not merely to afford access to a public road 
but also to afford access to a tomb, for carrying the harvest and for ‘any other 
necessary purpose’.”279 
It is clear from the above passage that Holmes J was trying to highlight that a right of 
way of necessity could be granted for “any other necessary purpose” besides its 
agricultural purpose. Lee280 argues that the right of way of necessity could be 
provided for any “other necessary purposes’’. Southwood is not convinced that a 
right of way of necessity must be limited to farming operations.281 He argues that 
there is no logical reason for restricting the use of a right of way of necessity to 
farming operations.282 According to him disputes may also arise where the dominant 
owner proposes to use the dominant tenement for anything from a rudimentary 
dwelling to the most elaborate commercial enterprise.283 He argues that although the 
Roman-Dutch authorities dealt with the right of way of necessity in the context of 
agriculture, none of them actually limited it to agricultural use.284 He refers to Lentz v 
Mullin285 and Naude v Ecoman Investments en Andere286 where the respective 
decisions did not limit the right of way of necessity to agricultural land. In the latter 
case there was a change in the use of the first respondent’s land (dominant 
tenement) from agricultural to tourism (public holiday resort). This change had the 
effect that the existing way of necessity over the applicant’s farm (servient tenement) 
to the first respondent’s farm had to carry more traffic. The court held that there was 
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no reason why recognition could not be given to the first respondent’s reasonable 
use requirements merely because the character of the use had changed from the 
time when the first (original) right of way of necessity vested.287 Van der Merwe, 
adopting the Louisiana approach on the right of way of necessity, argues that the 
right of way of necessity can be established to accommodate not only the agricultural 
needs of the landlocked dominant tenement, but also the commercial as well as the 
residential needs.288 He argues that the purpose for which the dominant tenement is 
used is irrelevant and it could be for agricultural, residential or any other use.289 
Regarding the use of the right of way of necessity in respect of residential land, the 
court in Lewis v S D Turner Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others290 decided on a claim 
regarding the right of way of necessity in respect of residential properties. Although 
the court dismissed the application for an order declaring a certain servitude of way 
over the applicant’s property to be a right of way of necessity, it is clear that had the 
applicant succeeded in its claim the court could have still ruled in its favour despite 
the properties in question being residential. Therefore, in light of the present day 
conditions and the authorities referred to above, one can conclude that a right of way 
of necessity can be granted for the benefit of land used for any purpose, and not just 
for agricultural purposes. The courts should, however, be careful not to overburden 
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the servient tenement, to avoid the exercise of this servitude contrary to the basic 
servitude principle civiliter modo. 
 
2 3 5 5 Compensation  
In principle, the dominant owner who seeks a permanent right of way of necessity 
must pay compensation to the servient owner. Regarding the determination of the 
amount of compensation payable, the dominant owner is required to pay a just or 
reasonable price.291 In Wilhelm v Norton,292 the court held that compensation must 
be in accordance with “Gluck’s measure”, thus “compensation must be in proportion 
to the advantage gained by the plaintiff and the disadvantages suffered by the 
defendant”.293 As stated in Wiles v Praeg,294 the disadvantage would include the 
servient owner’s need to fence the road and the inconvenience of being deprived of 
full enjoyment of his property. 
The dominant owner and the servient owner may agree on the amount of 
compensation amongst themselves.295 The dominant owner may even offer the 
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servient owner an amount of compensation.296 However, if the latter is not satisfied 
with the amount offered, he may produce information to the effect that the amount is 
not reasonable.297 The servient owner’s failure to produce the required information 
runs the risk of the court awarding the amount offered by the dominant owner.298  
In Van Rensburg v Coetzee299 Jansen JA held that it is impossible to determine 
the compensation that is payable without evidence regarding the nature and extent 
of the servitude demanded.300 The court further held that the amount of 
compensation is not necessarily dependent on the value of land only, but other 
relevant factors could have an effect on the value of the servitude.301 Such factors 
include the value of the servient tenement itself, the potential locality of the proposed 
way as well as other surrounding circumstances.302 Regarding the value of the 
servient tenement the court in Van Rensburg v Coetzee303 awarded the servient 
owner compensation equivalent to the market value of the surface area.304 However, 
it is not the servient tenement itself which is effectively being sold, but the right of 
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servitude over it.305 Southwood is of the view that the market value of the servitude 
must be the amount by which the dominant owner benefits.306 He suggests that in 
determining the amount of compensation for the servitude, it must be established 
what the willing buyer would pay a willing seller for such a servitude.307 The court in 
the Van Rensburg case just mentioned the other factors relevant for the 
determination of compensation but did not discuss them in detail. 
 
2 3 6 Registration of the right of way of necessity 
Praedial servitudes are limited real rights in land, which in terms of South African law 
must be registered in the deeds registry as soon as they are created.308 These 
servitudes must be registered in terms of section 76 of the Deeds Registry Act309 for 
such servitudes to have real effect. However, a right of way of necessity is an 
exceptional praedial servitude which does not necessarily require registration. The 
Appellate Division in the Van Rensburg case asked if it was necessary to have the 
right registered in the deeds registry for it to become a real right.310 The Court, 
however, refrained from deciding this issue holding that there was no need for it to 
decide on the question.311 Nevertheless, the court recommended that it is preferable, 
especially, for the acquirer of a permanent right of way of necessity to have the right 
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registered. 312 The same dictum was reiterated by Nugent JA in Aventura Ltd v 
Jackson NO and Others stating that it is usually desirable for a court order granting 
the right of way of necessity to be followed by the registration of a servitude to 
ensure that third parties have notice of the right of way.313 
As a general rule, unregistered servitudes do not bind third parties unless such 
persons knew of its existence before entering into an agreement with the 
landowner.314 Southwood315 argues that the judicially enforced right of way of 
necessity without registration does not amount to a real right but to a mere personal 
right that does not bind the servient owner’s successors in title. According to him, 
South African law only recognises a few exceptions to the rule of registration of real 
rights, which excludes the right of way of necessity.316 Southwood seems to be 
wrong though. Van der Merwe and Lubbe argue that registration of the right of way 
of necessity is unnecessary for the very reason that it is enforced by a court order 
and its existence is dependent on the continued existence of a situation of 
necessity.317 Van der Merwe argues that registration of the right way of necessity 
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does not affect its enforceability against the world318 and therefore the dominant 
owner is not bound by the public record doctrine.319 Van der Merwe and Lubbe are 
correct in arguing that a court enforced servitude does not necessarily require 
registration. This argument is also supported by Maasdorp,320 who argues that a 
court established servitude binds all the servient owners’ successors in title, whether 
the servitude had been registered or not. 
In conclusion, a right of way of necessity differs from other praedial servitude in 
that it does not necessarily have to be registered for it to be binding against the 
world. It is an exception to the rule on registration of real rights in land. 
 
2 3 7 Termination of the right of way of necessity 
The right of way of necessity differs from ordinary rights of way in its manner of 
termination.321 Unlike ordinary servitudes, the right of way of necessity terminates 
when the situation of necessity ceases to exist. 322 This could be a situation where for 
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example a new public road is constructed adjacent to the enclosed land.323 It could 
also be in instances where the economic activities that brought about the need for a 
right of way of necessity is terminated, for example, where agricultural activities are 
moved to another side of the dominant tenement that does not require the use of a 
right of way of necessity.324  
If the situation of necessity ceases to exist, the servient owner can ask the 
dominant owner to cancel the servitude, if it was registered, and also to stop using it 
regardless of whether it was registered or not.325 Alternatively, the servient owner 
can approach the court for a declaratory order lifting the right of way of necessity.326 
Otherwise, the right of way of necessity can also be terminated just like any other 
servitude, for example by merger,327 agreement or expropriation. 
 
2 4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to give an overview on the law relating to the right of 
way of necessity, with the specific focus on the general principles. The chapter starts 
by tracing the origin of the South African law regarding the right of way of necessity. 
According to this chapter, the South African law on the right of way of necessity is 
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 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125 125; CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared 
with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1406.  
324
 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125 125. See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage 
compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1406.  
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 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 117. 
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traced back to Roman law, which recognised the right of way to a family grave, and 
also to Germanic law, which recognised the road of egress. These two respective 
servitudes were adopted by the Roman-Dutch law and developed into a general right 
of way that includes all land which had no way out or did not abut on a high road. 
This was then received into South African law from Roman-Dutch law where it forms 
part of the law of servitudes falling under the category of praedial servitudes.  
In the third part of the chapter, section 2 3 1 indicates that the right of way of 
necessity forms part of servitude law and is categorised under praedial servitudes. In 
that regard the right of way of necessity is a servitude that exists in respect of 
immovable property, either rural or urban. Section 2 3 2 identifies various forms of 
rights of way of necessity. In terms of this section, there are two kinds of rights of 
way of necessity, namely the permanent right of way and the temporary right of way. 
The two differ from each other depending on the nature and the extent of the 
situation of necessity, and in that the permanent right of way of necessity is granted 
against payment of reasonable compensation by the dominant owner to the servient 
owner. The rest of the chapter discusses the permanent right of way of necessity. 
Section 2 3 3 of the chapter discusses the manner in which the right of way of 
necessity is established. This section illustrates how the right of way of necessity 
differs from other ordinary servitudes in its mode of creation. Unlike other rights of 
way that are created by contract, the right of way of necessity is established by 
operation of law immediately when the dominant tenement becomes landlocked. 
This right is, however, enforceable against a specific servient tenement by way of a 
court order, without the servient owner’s consent. Courts enforce this servitude by 
confirming the existence of the right and allocating and defining a route upon which 
the right must be exercised. The general trend is that the dominant owner may only 
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approach the court for enforcement of this servitude after an unsuccessful attempt to 
get a negotiated right of way by contract.  
The next section, namely section 2 3 4 discusses requirements that must be 
satisfied before the dominant owner could claim a right of way of necessity. It is 
argued in this section that the dominant owner must prove two requirements, namely 
landlocking and necessity. This entails showing the court that her property is 
enclosed in a way that she has no way out to a public road or that an alternative way 
is available but is inadequate to enable her reasonable access to the public road. 
Again, she must establish and prove to the court why it is necessary for her to be 
granted access to a public road through a route over the servient tenement. The 
dominant owner could for instance show that the access is necessary for conducting 
viable farming operations. This section indicates that an owner who through her own 
fault, design or negligence cut her land off from public road access would not be 
entitled to a right of way of necessity. However, courts have in certain instances 
ignored this principle.  
Section 2 3 5 discusses ancillary conditions precedent to the enforcement of 
the right of way of necessity. This section looks at specific aspects without which the 
right of way of necessity cannot be exercised. First of all, regarding the route, the 
court must determine the shortest route that causes the least amount of burden to 
the servient owner. In doing so courts are guided by the principle “ter naaste lage en 
minster schade,” which entails that the right of way of necessity must traverse the 
neighbouring land that lies between the landlocked land and the nearest public road 
in the least damaging or burdensome place. Where a court finds the identified 
servient tenement unsuitable to carry the right of way of necessity either because it 
is impassable or because it will be detrimentally affected, it may refuse to declare the 
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right of way of necessity enforceable and may refer the dominant owner to seek 
access elsewhere. Secondly, regarding the condition of the public road, the identified 
route over the servient tenement must connect the dominant tenement to a public 
road. The road which the dominant owner seeks connection to must be recognised 
as a public road. However, this section argues that the right of way of necessity 
could also be granted to connect to other public transport systems besides a public 
road: the right of way of necessity should be granted for connection to any public 
transport system and not just for connection to a public road. Thirdly, the section 
considers the relevance of the use of the dominant tenement, and asks whether the 
granting of the right of way of necessity is restricted to land used for a specific 
purpose, namely agricultural purposes. The section concludes that the right of way of 
necessity may be granted for the benefit of land used for any purpose, and not just 
for agricultural purposes. Lastly, the section considers the compensation 
requirement and shows that a permanent right of way of necessity can only be 
granted upon payment of compensation by the dominant owner to the servient 
owner. It further sets out how the amount of compensation is determined. The court 
in most instances determines the amount of compensation payable, but the parties 
are not precluded from agreeing on the amount of compensation. 
Section 2 3 6 considers whether registration of the right of way of necessity is 
necessary. This section shows the real nature of the right of way of necessity. It is 
argued in this section that a right of way of necessity like all other praedial servitudes 
is a limited real right in land, which in principle must be registered in the deeds office. 
However, this section shows that the right of way of necessity differs from other 
praedial servitudes in that it is not necessary for it to be registered to have real effect 
against the world. In other words, the dominant owner and all his successors in title 
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are not bound by the public record. Nevertheless, it is still recommended that the 
right be registered. 
Lastly, section 2 3 7 discusses the manner in which the right of way of 
necessity is terminated. It is indicated that this servitude is mostly terminated when 
the situation of necessity ceases to exist. One of the examples given in this section 
is a situation where a new public road is built adjacent to the dominant tenement. In 
such an instance, the servient owner may ask the dominant owner to cancel the 
servitude and to stop using it regardless of whether it’s registered or not. 
Alternatively, the servient owner may approach the court for a declaratory order 
lifting the right of way of necessity. 
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Chapter 3: Justification of the right of way of necessity 
 
3 1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the reasons justifying the possibility of acquiring a right of 
way of necessity and the reasons justifying the enforcement thereof by a court order 
instead of the usual acquisition of servitude by agreement. The chapter starts by 
showing the practical necessity for having the right of way of necessity in certain 
circumstances. Following this, the chapter discusses the public policy reasons that 
are the primary basis for the right of way of necessity. In the process, the chapter 
refers to two conflicting jurisprudential approaches regarding the right of way of 
necessity as discussed by the Dutch scholar Van Apeldoorn in his treatment of the 
Dutch right of way of necessity.1 Van Apeldoorn distinguishes between what he calls 
the “individualistic” and the “social” approach.2 The individualistic approach offers a 
strict view of the right of way of necessity, based on the individualistic nature of 
ownership. On the other hand, the social approach favours a more flexible approach 
towards the right of way of necessity on the basis of social reasons. In this 
perspective, the chapter considers the approach followed in South African case law, 
relying mainly on the work of Van der Merwe and Lubbe3 and early case law. It is 
important to ascertain the approach adopted by the courts and the reasons behind 
each approach, since these reasons could justify the power of the courts to grant a 
                                            
1
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187. See also Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 670G-H. 
2
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 185. 
3
 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
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right of way of necessity and the negative effects that has on the freedom of 
ownership. In Chapter four it is shown that the validity of the justification for the right 
of way of necessity is an important consideration in deciding whether the deprivation 
of the servient landowner’s property that is brought about by an award of a right of 
way of necessity is arbitrary or not. 
Finally, this chapter also considers the right of way of necessity from a law and 
economics perspective. This part of the chapter focuses on the Coase theorem,4 
together with Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between property rules and 
liability rules.5 Law and economics theory is useful in determining the justification for 
legal rules that promote efficiency or utility by awarding resources to those who value 
them most6 and rules that discourage conduct that wastes resources.7 The 
implications of this theory are considered to determine when courts are justified to 
enforce a right of way of necessity against the will of the servient landowner. 
 
3 2 Why is the right of way of necessity necessary? 
This section seeks to show the practical need for an owner of landlocked land to 
have a right of way of necessity. The right of way of necessity has proved to be of 
                                            
4
 RH Coase “The problem of social cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1-44. 
5
 This part of law and economics theory regarding the rules for transferring rights was developed by G 
Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” 
(1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128, extending the Coase theorem formulated by RH Coase 
“The problem of social cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1-44. See TJ Miceli “Property” in 
JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2
nd
 ed 2005) 246-260 249. 
6
 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2
nd
 ed 2005) 
246-260 248; EJ Marais Acquisitive prescription in view of the property clause (2011) unpublished 
LLD thesis Stellenbosch University 216. 
7
 EJ Marais Acquisitive prescription in view of the property clause (2011) unpublished LLD thesis 
Stellenbosch University 216. 
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great practical importance in promoting the efficient use of landlocked land for 
agricultural,8 mining, tourism and habitation purposes, as is evident from facts of the 
following decided cases. 
The right of way of necessity has always been associated with the efficient use 
of landlocked agricultural land. The Appellate Division in Van Rensburg v Coetzee9 
stated that a right of way of necessity must be able to assist the dominant owner of 
landlocked land, if he is a farmer, to continue with viable farming operations. This 
servitude is necessary for landlocked agricultural land which requires access to a 
public road for regular entrance and exit of agricultural implements,10 and also for 
purposes of transporting farm produce to the market. In Illing v Woodhouse,11 the 
court also granted the right of way of necessity over the servient owner’s farm in 
favour of the dominant owner (applicant), a farmer. The dominant owner required the 
right of way for purposes of transporting his anticipated substantial crop harvest to 
the railway station. Furthermore, the court in Sanders NO and Another v Edwards 
NO and Others,12 granted the dominant owners a right of way of necessity, which 
was necessary for them to conduct extensive protea farming operations.  
The right of way of necessity has also been granted in favour of landlocked 
land used for mining purposes. This is evident from SA Yster en Staal Industriële 
                                            
8
 See in this regard MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil 
law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 806. See also Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) 
SA 655 (A) 674B, where the role of land in South Africa’s farming activities was mentioned in passing.  
9
 Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671E. 
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 Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671E. 
11
 (1923) 44 NPD 166. In this case the right of way of necessity was claimed in terms of the Natal 
Road Board Law 36 of 1888, sec 17(b), which provided that: “The expression ‘by-road’ as used in this 
Act means: … (b) A way of necessity, including a reasonably necessary means of access to a public 
road or a railway station, stopping place or siding.” See Illing v Woodhouse (1923) 44 NPD 166 170. 
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 Sanders NO and Another v Edwards NO and Others 2003 (5) SA 8 (C). 
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Korporasie Bpk v Van der Merwe.13 In that case the court granted the dominant 
owner the right of way of necessity to connect its land to a public road for the 
purposes of conducting mining activities. This servitude has also been established in 
favour of landlocked land used for production, tourism and residential purposes. For 
instance, in Saner v Inanda Road Board,14 the court confirmed the decision by the 
Road Board to reopen a road on the servient owner’s land in favour of the dominant 
owner, who required the road to connect his landlocked land to a public road to 
transport his factory products (sugar) to a closer railway station. The court 
acknowledged that access to the road in question was necessary for the owner of a 
“large central sugar-factory” to conduct his business operations.15 In Naudé v 
Ecoman Investments en Andere,16 the right of way of necessity was granted to 
enable the use of the dominant tenement for tourism purposes. In Jackson v 
Aventura Ltd17 the court granted the right of way of necessity in favour of plaintiffs 
who sought the servitude for the purposes of constructing a road intended to provide 
vehicular access to their landlocked land, upon which they intended to erect 
residential dwellings.18 
The above discussion indicates the need for having a right of way of necessity 
in different sets of circumstances where the owner of landlocked land needs access 
to the public transport systems. Without this servitude, the owner of landlocked land 
could suffer great inconvenience, particularly if the economically efficient use of such 
                                            
13
 [1984] 2 All SA 403 (A). 
14
 (1892) 13 NLR 227. 
15
 (1892) 13 NLR 227. 
16
 1994 (2) SA 95 (T) 99-101. 
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 Jackson v Aventura Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C). 
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 See also in this regard Neilson v Mahoud 1925 EDL 26, where the court granted the defendant 
(dominant owner) a right of way of necessity over the plaintiffs land to enable him (dominant owner) 
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land is impossible or not viable without access to the public transport systems. The 
lack of access to the public transport system could results in the removal of the 
landlocked land from commercial, public and private use,19 and as such no 
landowner would want to reside on or conduct business in an inaccessible location. 
 
3 3 Public policy and the right of way of necessity 
The previous section showed the practical need for making a right of way of 
necessity available to the owner of landlocked land in certain situations. This section 
takes the discussion further and considers the basis for the right of way of necessity. 
In other words, this section deals with the justifications for having a right of way of 
necessity and also for allowing the courts to enforce this servitude. Servitudes like a 
right of way are normally acquired by way of agreement between the relevant 
landowners, and therefore it is necessary to determine whether it is justified to allow 
the courts to grant such a servitude in the absence of agreement, or even against 
the will of the servient landowner. The reasons for acknowledging this possibility in 
the form of a right of way of necessity that is acquired by operation of law, and for 
allowing the courts to grant such a right in individual cases are mainly based on 
policy considerations. These policy considerations and the arguments based on 
them are considered in this section of the chapter. 
South African law and a few other jurisdictions20 recognise public policy as the 
basis for the granting a right of way of necessity by operation of law, in other words 
                                            
19
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1369. 
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without agreement by the relevant parties. Public policy in this sense is particularly 
concerned with ensuring or promoting the efficient use of land.21 In terms of public 
policy, valuable land situated in desirable and strategic areas should not be taken 
out of use and commerce,22 and for that reason the law discourages sterilisation of 
land due to insufficient access to the public transport networks.23 In simple terms, 
public policy favours the full utilisation of valuable land and discourages the possible 
loss of efficient use of that land due to landlocking.24 
This policy argument is similar to the one advanced by Kiewitz25 in her 
discussion of the decision in Linvestment CC v Hammersley (Linvestment)26 
concerning the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. The 
policy reasons justifying the right of way of necessity are related to the ones 
advanced for allowing unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. In 
Linvestment the court established the principle that allows for the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way. According to this principle, the 
                                                                                                                                       
Rockholt v Keaty 237 So2d 633 (La 1970) 668; Joyce Tenney v Town of Athens et al 987 A2d 337 (Vt 
2009) para 1.  
21
 See in general CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South 
African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1369; MD Southwood The 
compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 99; Anonymous “Way of necessity: Hancock v Henderson’’ 
(1965) 25 Maryland Law Review 254-259 258. See also Rockholt v Keaty 237 So2d 633 (La 1970) 
668; Joyce Tenney v Town of Athens et al 987 A2d 337 (Vt 2009) para 1. 
22
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1369. See also Rockholt v Keaty 237 So2d 633 
(La 1970) 668, a Louisiana decision upon which Van der Merwe founds his argument. 
23
 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 99. See also Anonymous “Way of 
necessity: Hancock v Henderson’’ (1965) 25 Maryland Law Review 254-259 258. 
24
 Anonymous “Way of necessity: Hancock v Henderson’’ (1965) 25 Maryland Law Review 254-259 
258. 
25
 L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University. 
26
 [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA). 
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landowner concerned (servient owner) can unilaterally relocate a specified servitude 
of right of way, provided that she is or will be materially inconvenienced in the use of 
her property by the continued existence of that specified servitude in the present 
location, that the relocation occurs on the servient land, that the relocation will not 
materially prejudice the affected land owner (dominant owner), that the servient 
owner pays all the costs involved in the relocation of the servitude, and that the 
relocation is ordered by a court after having considered all these factors.27  
The Linvestment decision did not concern a right of way of necessity but a 
mutually agreed servitude of right of way, but this decision is still relevant because 
both the right of way of necessity and the unilateral relocation principle concern 
forced transfer of property rights, based on similar policy reasons. Like a grant of a 
right of way of necessity, the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of 
way is concerned with the efficient use of the affected land. According to Kiewitz, 
unilateral relocation is justified when it helps increase the value of the land by 
encouraging the landowner to make improvements on the land and to use it 
efficiently.28 It makes the landowner better off by enabling her to make use of her 
land to its maximum utility,29 without making the affected servient landowner worse 
off.30 In other words, like the granting of a right way of necessity, unilateral relocation 
of a specified servitude of right of way will be allowed if the forced transfer of 
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 Linvestment CC v Hammersly [2008] 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 35. See also L Kiewitz Relocation of 
a specified servitude of right of way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 2. 
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 L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 117. 
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 L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 118. 
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property rights (by court order) will promote efficient use of the dominant land, 
without prejudicing the rights of the affected servient owner.31 
However, an important aspect of the public policy argument is that it is not 
based purely on the individual benefit of the dominant owner who acquires a right of 
way of necessity or who is allowed to have the existing right of way relocated 
unilaterally. Public policy in this regard safeguards and benefits both the dominant 
owner’s economic interests and the social interest. Regarding the economic interest 
of the dominant owner, Southwood argues that the right of way of necessity 
encourages the economic use of landlocked land.32 Van der Merwe similarly argues 
that the right of way of necessity can, in principle, be granted to advance the 
economic exploitation of land in general.33 To this extent, the granting of a right of 
way of necessity benefits the individual (dominant) landowner. Regarding the social 
interest, it is argued that the right of way of necessity is also based on social 
considerations concerned with encouraging the efficient use of land because society 
disapproves landlocking that renders land useless.34 In other words, the demands of 
society do not allow for a person to hold land in perpetual idleness resulting from 
landlocking.35 The right of way of necessity is viewed as a way to open the potential 
of land as a means of production and to allow the use of private property to benefit 
society.36 In this perspective, the public policy-based reason for allowing a right of 
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 L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
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 MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 106. 
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 CG van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “Law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 2003 Annual 
Survey of South African Law 375-428 415. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in 
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 Joyce Tenney v Town of Athens et al 987 A2d 337 (Vt 2009) para 1. 
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 Joyce Tenney v Town of Athens et al 987 A2d 337 (Vt 2009) para 1. 
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way of necessity does more than just to benefit a private individual in his capacity as 
landowner; it also benefits the public. In other words, the right of way of necessity 
fulfils both a primary and a secondary role, which includes the individual’s interests 
and the public interest respectively. For example, unlocking landlocked land that 
could be used efficiently for agricultural or mining purposes does not only benefit the 
individual landowner (primary role), but also the public or society at large, including 
the state (secondary role). The unlocking of landlocked land in these situations 
creates employment opportunities for the public and the state derives tax benefits 
from the productive use of the land. However, if land lacks access to a public road it 
could become useless and the landowner could lose his business; jobs could be lost; 
the market may be deprived of the potential produce of the land;37 and the state may 
not derive any benefits in the form of taxation or increased productivity.  
In this regard it is worth considering the concept of “reasonableness,” which is 
one of the criteria sometimes referred to in cases concerning the right of way of 
necessity. This concept was considered in English v C J M Harmse Investments CC 
and Another,38 but the court cautioned against unnecessary interference with 
ownership rights unless the interference is necessitated by the dictates of 
reasonableness and fairness.39 The court found that reasonableness was not the 
only criterion on the basis of which a permanent right of way of necessity is 
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 Joyce Tenney v Town of Athens et al 987 A2d 337 (Vt 2009) para 1. 
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 2007 (3) SA 415 (N). 
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 English v C J M Harmse Investments CC and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 422B-D. See also CG 
van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “The law of property (including real security)” 2007 Annual Survey of 
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granted40and pointed out that reasonableness is not a justification for the right of way 
of necessity. In fact, the right of way of necessity is a servitude that is not based on 
reasonableness but on necessity. Reasonableness does feature in right of way of 
necessity cases, but only after a right of way of necessity has been declared by a 
court in favour of a particular dominant tenement on the basis of necessity. Once the 
right of way has been awarded on the basis of necessity, reasonableness features 
as one of the criteria used to determine the route upon the servient tenement that 
causes the smallest amount of damage to the servient tenement (‘ter naaste lage en 
minste schade’). 
In sum, the reasons for having a right of way of necessity that is awarded by 
operation of law are largely based on public policy. In terms of public policy, valuable 
land should be used efficiently whenever possible and therefore, landlocked land 
should be opened up to the public road system to make efficient use possible. The 
policy reasons for the award of this right take into account that efficient use of land 
does not benefit the private land owner only, but also benefits society in general by 
raising productivity; creating valuable produce; creating jobs; and providing a basis 
for state revenue in the form of taxation. 
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 English v C J M Harmse Investments CC and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 422E. See also CG van 
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3 4 Two jurisprudential views on the right of way of necessity 
In Dutch law two jurisprudential approaches to the right of way of necessity are 
distinguished.41 Van Apeldoorn distinguishes between the individualistic and the 
social view.42 
Van Apeldoorn shows that supporters of the individualistic view argue that the 
right of way of necessity infringes on the individualistic nature of ownership.43 They 
believe that protection of your own benefit is the best guarantee for general well-
being and that state interference with private ownership should be restricted to the 
minimum.44 Van Apeldoorn further states that supporters of this view strongly believe 
that individual ownership should not be limited, for it creates a hateful infringement.45 
In terms of this approach, rules regarding the right of way of necessity should be 
interpreted as strictly as possible and a right of way of necessity should only be 
allowed where it is absolutely necessary (complete isolation of property), for example 
where there is a state of emergency, and when the right of way of necessity could be 
                                            
41
 See in this regard LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht 
Notaris-Ambt en Registratie 185-187. 
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 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood-of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
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established with minimum impact on the servient tenement.46 It is clear from this 
discussion that supporters of the individualistic view argue strongly in favour of 
protection of ownership. They discourage any form of interference with property 
rights. For them ownership should only be limited in exceptional circumstances, 
which should be in the nature of an emergency.47 Otherwise, the dominant owner 
has to negotiate with the servient owner to have a right of way over the servient 
tenement.48 In this sense, followers of the individualistic approach disapprove of the 
law imposing a servitude of right of way upon the servient tenement without the 
consent of the servient owner. In other words, courts should not be allowed to 
enforce rights of way of necessity except in genuine emergency situations.  
The social view offers a different perspective on the right of way of necessity. In 
terms of this approach, each piece of land should be exploited fully for the general 
benefit of everyone.49 In terms of this view, the public interest prevails over individual 
interests50 and accordingly the servient owner will have to deal with limitations on his 
rights if the public interest demands it.51 Van Apeldoorn favours the social view; he 
argues that an owner of land has a social function to fulfil, which is to use his 
                                            
46
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood-of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 185. 
47
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood-of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 185. 
48
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 185. 
49
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 186. However, Van Apeldoorn states that a way of necessity is not only based on 
the general benefit (that a piece of land would otherwise lie unused) but also on Christian morals – as 
Jesus says: ‘We should do to others as we would like them to do to us,’ see page 185. 
50
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 187. 
51
 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 187. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
property in accordance with its purpose and for the benefit of society.52 It follows that 
the social view allows limitations of ownership, as long as such limitations benefit the 
general public in some material way. This in effect means that imposing the right of 
way of necessity over the servient tenement is justified if it offers some kind of 
benefit to society. The social view argument effectively corresponds with the public 
policy argument discussed in the previous section.  
One can draw the conclusion from these arguments that it is more easily 
justified to grant a right of way of necessity when there are public interests at stake. 
Therefore, this servitude is not just about the benefit of the individual owner but also 
about the benefits that efficient use of the land holds for the public in general. In 
other words, the efficient use of land by the dominant owner should offer some 
benefit to the public, for instance in the form of employment, food production, and 
tax, before the interference with private ownership that is implied by granting a right 
of way of necessity would be justified. 
It can be said in conclusion that the individualistic and the social approach differ 
from each other in an important respect. The former is in principle against the 
granting of the right of way of necessity, whereas the latter is not opposed to it in 
principle. The individualistic approach is primarily concerned with the protection of 
private ownership against state interference, whereas the social approach is 
concerned with efficient use of land for the public benefit. The social approach 
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 LJ van Apeldoorn “De nood- of uitweg” (1937) 3512 Weekblad Voor Privaatrecht Notaris-Ambt en 
Registratie 185-187 187. According to Van Apeldoorn the most authoritative Dutch jurists, except for 
Ulrich Huber, are silent regarding the question of the purpose which the land must serve for the 
purposes of the right of way of necessity. According to Van Apeldoorn only Huber says that the right 
of way of necessity serves the interests of agriculture. See U Huber Heedendaagse rechtsgeleertheyt 
(translated by P Gane The jurisprudence of my time vol 1 1939) 330 para 19. 
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features a public policy element about the public interest in ensuring or promoting 
efficient use of land.  
In an influential article, Van der Merwe and Lubbe53 demonstrate the 
importance of these two approaches for the South African law regarding the right of 
way of necessity. Arguing that both Roman law and Germanic law influenced the 
development of South African law on the right of way of necessity,54 the authors 
show how the local law regarding the right of way of necessity developed from a 
strict, individualistic approach to a more flexible, social approach.55 The strict 
approach was based on the traditional Roman concept of ownership as an 
individualistic, absolute and exclusive right,56 which restricted the right of way of 
necessity to cases of absolute landlocking.57 On this basis, followers of the traditional 
Roman concept of ownership, relying on the individualistic approach, requires 
absolute landlocking of land.58 By contrast, the flexible Germanic community-based 
approach allows for the granting of the right of way of necessity not only in cases of 
absolute landlocking, but also where the community interests are at stake.59 On this 
                                            
53
 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125. 
54
 Hybrid in a sense of the influence of Roman law and Germanic law. See in this regard chapter 1 
section 2 2. 
55
 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125 118-119. 
56
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1366. 
57
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367. 
58
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1382. 
59
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1367-1368. 
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basis, followers of the community based approach argues that a right of way of 
necessity should not be limited to absolute landlocking, but also to cases where the 
landlocked land does have access to the public road, but the existing access is not 
reasonably sufficient for the efficient exploitation of the land (for example, for efficient 
conduct of viable farming operations).60 Van der Merwe61 argues that early South 
African case law seems to follow the individualistic approach to a right of way of 
necessity. 
The granting of a right of way of necessity in spite of existing access to the 
dominant tenement would require a shift from an individualistic approach to a social 
approach that takes the needs of society into consideration.62 More recently, South 
African case law has apparently formulated and approved circumstances under 
which a move from an individualistic approach to a social approach can be justified.63 
In essence, the dominant owner must be able to show that she has no reasonably 
sufficient access to the public transport systems for herself and her servents to 
enable her, if she is a farmer, to conduct viable farming operations.64 This move to a 
social approach is based on public policy promoting the efficient use of land. This is 
evident from case law where a right of way of necessity has been granted to promote 
                                            
60
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1382. 
61
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1383. 
62
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1383. 
63
 This move was formulated in Lentz v Mullins 1921 EDC 268 and expressly approved in Van 
Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A). See also J Scott “The difficult process of applying easy 
principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 172; CG van 
der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” 
(1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1385.  
64
 Lentz v Mullins 1921 EDC 268 confirmed in Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 671B. 
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the economic viability of a farming operation or to satisfy the operational needs of the 
dominant tenement.65 According to Van der Merwe and Lubbe,66 South African case 
law indicates a reconciliation of the individualistic approach with the social approach. 
Courts adopt the individualistic approach (protecting the institution of ownership) 
where the use of the existing access route does not cause serious prejudice for the 
dominant owner to justify the enforcement of a right of way of necessity on the 
servient tenement.67 This approach involves evaluating the prejudicial effects of the 
existing access route for the continuing viable farming operations, compared to the 
prejudicial effects that would follow for the servient owner’s property rights if the 
proposed right of way of necessity were granted. This is referred to as “an 
appropriate balance of convenience’’.68 This criterion will only apply in cases where 
                                            
65
 See Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 670H-671. See also Neilson v Mahoud 1925 
EDL 26 32-33; Lentz v Mullins 1921 EDC 268 270; Illing v Woodhouse 1923 NPD 166 170-171. See 
further CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African 
way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1385.  
66
 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125 116. See also CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage 
compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1385; 
Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 670H-671. 
67
 See for instance English v C J M Harmse Investments and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N), where the 
plaintiff was denied a permanent right of way of necessity for the reason that he placed no evidence 
before the court to the effect that absence of the sought permanent right of way of necessity would 
result in the inability to conduct viable farming operations. See also in this regard Van Schalkwijk v Du 
Plessis and Others (1900) 17 SC 454. 
68
 English v C J M Harmse Investments and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 421I-J. See also J Scott 
“The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ 
(2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 167. See further CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced 
passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 
1385.  
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something less than absolute necessity is considered,69 in other words when the 
courts adopt the flexible approach to justify the granting of a right of way of necessity 
for purposes of promoting the efficient exploitation of land that is not absolutely 
landlocked but the efficient use of which is hampered by the insufficiency of the 
existing access.  
Adopting a more flexible, social approach does not mean that rights of way of 
necessity would be granted without any consideration of the servient owner’s 
property rights. In this respect, the conflicting interests of the affected landowners 
would have to be balanced as well. According to Van der Merwe, granting a 
servitude of right of way that imposes a heavy burden on the servient tenement will 
only be justified if the dominant owner is in desperate need of access to a public 
road.70 In the same vein, Scott argues that a necessary corollary of the economic 
viability of the dominant tenement is the servient owner’s peaceful occupation of her 
property, to which she has a right qua owner.71 Therefore, even if the South African 
courts are in the process of shifting from an individualistic towards a social approach, 
with the implication that they would grant a right of way of necessity more readily 
than before, this does not mean that the interests of the affected servient owner 
would be ignored or underestimated. 
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 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125. See also English v C J M Harmse Investments and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 
(N) 420C. 
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 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1385.  
71
 J Scott “The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex 
necessitate’’ (2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 167. 
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3 5 Law and economics analysis of the right of way of necessity 
This section analyses the justification of the right of way of necessity in view of the 
Coase theorem,72 considered together with Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction 
between property rules and liability rules.73 In terms of the Coase theorem, when 
transaction costs are low, in other words, when it is easy to negotiate the transfer of 
property, the market will normally ensure that rights move to the person who wants 
them the most.74 This in effect means that when transaction costs are low, parties 
can easily reach the most efficient outcome without state intervention.75 What this 
means for servitude law is that, where a servitude of right of way can easily be 
acquired through negotiation, courts should not interfere and it should be left to the 
parties to reach a negotiated agreement. In other words, if a landlocked owner can 
easily negotiate with the servient owner for an ordinary servitude of right of way, 
there is no justification for courts to enforce a right of way of necessity by operation 
of law or in the absence of agreement. Sometimes there could be a market failure 
that results in significant transaction costs, thereby prohibiting the realisation of an 
efficient outcome through bargaining. Examples of market failures of this nature in 
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 RH Coase “The problem of social cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1-44. 
73
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128. This is a theory regarding rules for transferring 
rights. This theory is viewed as an extension of the Coase theorem. See also TJ Miceli “Property” in 
JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2
nd
 ed 2005) 246-260 249. 
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 See in general RH Coase “The problem of social cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1-44 
1-19. See also TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 
(2
nd
 ed 2005) 246-260 247. See further L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way 
(2010) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 125; EJ Marais Acquisitive prescription in 
view of the property clause (2011) unpublished LLD thesis Stellenbosch University 217. 
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 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2
nd
 ed 2005) 
246-260 247. See also L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (2010) 
unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 125. 
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the context of servitude law would be situations where the dominant owner would 
have to negotiate with a very large number of potential servient owners who might be 
difficult to identify and contact; or a holdout situation where the potential servient 
owner abuses her position to enforce an unreasonably high price for the servitude. In 
terms of the Coase theorem, state intervention might be justified in those instances 
because high transaction costs prevent the parties from reaching an efficient 
outcome through negotiations.76 For servitude law this means that enforcing a right 
of way of necessity by a court order will only be justified when it is impossible or 
unreasonably difficult for the dominant owner to negotiate for an ordinary right of 
way.77 
In essence, the Coase theorem concerns the question when the state is 
justified to enforce a transfer of a servitude by way of court order, instead of leaving 
it to negotiations; according to the theorem state interference is only justified when 
transaction costs are too high and there is a “market failure”.78 Ordinarily, the 
dominant owner should acquire a right of way through negotiations. The main 
implication of the Coase theorem is that courts are only justified to enforce a right of 
way of necessity once the dominant owner can prove that it is unreasonably difficult 
or impossible for her to acquire a negotiated right of way from the servient owner. In 
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 See in general RH Coase “The problem of social cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law & Economics 1-44 
1-19. See also TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 
(2
nd
 ed 2005) 246-260 248. 
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 This could happen in a situation where the servient owner and the dominant owner are unable to 
reach an agreement regarding the creation of a servitude of right way for the benefit of the dominant 
tenement. For instance, this could be as a result of financial disagreements, cultural impediments, 
and procedural obstacles between the parties.  
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 For more on the concept market failure see JM Buchanan & WC Stubblebine “Externality” (1962) 
29 Economica 371-384; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar companion to law and 
economics (2
nd
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the absence of proof that the dominant owner has tried unsuccessfully to acquire an 
ordinary servitude of right of way by contract, the courts should therefore find that 
necessity has not been proved and should refuse to grant a right of way of necessity. 
A similar result appears from consideration of Calabresi and Melamed’s 
distinction between property rules and liability rules.79 Property rules protect property 
rights strictly in so far as they do not allow any person to acquire property rights from 
the owner unless the owner voluntarily agrees to the transfer.80 In other words, 
property rules protect property rights to the extent that the owner can insist on 
keeping them and refuse to transfer them to anyone else. In fact, property rules do 
not provide room for state intervention in the transfer of property rights.81 Under 
property rules, any person who wishes to acquire property rights from the property 
owner must negotiate with the owner through a voluntary transaction of which the 
terms and conditions are agreed to by the owner.82 Like property rules, liability rules 
protect property rights. However, unlike property rules, under liability rules a transfer 
of property rights is sometimes enforced against the will of the property owner, 
against payment of reasonable compensation, usually by way of an order of the 
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 This is regarded as a natural extension of Coase‘s analysis of the externality problem. See G 
Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” 
(1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128. See also TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The 
Elgar companion to law and economics (2
nd
 ed 2005) 246-260 247; A Bell & G Parchomovsky 
“Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 3. 
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 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1105. 
81
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1092. 
82
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1092, 1105; L Kaplow & S Shavell “Property 
rules versus liability rules: An economic analysis” (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 713-790 757; A 
Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 3. 
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courts or other relevant bodies.83 Liability rules allow for state intervention to ensure 
the efficient transfer of property rights, without the agreement and even against the 
will of the property owner, by replacing the property rights that are forcibly 
transferred with compensation in the form of a money payment.84 The state normally 
intervenes in this way to impose obligations on individuals that would never have 
been created by way of private negotiations; the most obvious example being 
expropriation of private property for a public purpose and against payment of 
compensation.85 The main difference between property rules and liability rules is that 
under property rules, the owner‘s consent is necessary for the transfer of property 
rights, whereas consent is not necessary under a liability rule and the owner is 
compensated for the forcible loss or transfer of property instead.86  
The implication of this distinction for servitude law is that, in a system 
dominated by property rules, servitudes can only be created by way of voluntary 
agreement. By contrast, in a system that allows for liability rules servitudes may 
sometimes be created or transferred or extinguished by operation of law, without the 
consent of the affected owner, against payment of compensation. The common law 
right of way of necessity can therefore be seen as a liability rule that replaces a 
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 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
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70 Iowa Law Review 615-661 631. 
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property rule and allows courts to impose a servitude of right way over the servient 
owner’s tenement by court order, without the cooperation of and even against the will 
of the servient landowner, against payment of compensation.  
Calabresi and Melamed argue that property rules should be preferred over 
liability rules when transaction costs are low, that is, when parties are able to bargain 
with one another on an amicable basis.87 On the other hand, liability rules should be 
preferred when a transfer is desirable for some overriding reason (such as economic 
policy regarding efficient land use) but difficult to negotiate because transaction costs 
are high, that is, when parties are unable to engage in voluntary negotiations for 
some reason.88 The implication of the distinction between the property rules and 
liability rules for servitude law is that courts should only be justified to enforce a right 
of way of necessity against the will of the servient owner where it has been proved 
that it is unreasonably difficult or impossible for the dominant owner to acquire a 
negotiated servitude of way by contract. This is the same conclusion that is indicated 
by the Coase theorem. Both the Coase theorem and the distinction between property 
rules and liability rules therefore indicate that enforcement of a right of way of 
necessity by court order is only justified where it is impossible for the dominant 
owner to negotiate for an ordinary servitude of way. The onus of proof should 
therefore, according to law and economics theory, rest on the party claiming a right 
of way of necessity to prove not only that the right of way is necessary for practical 
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and policy reasons related to efficient use of the land, but also that she has tried, 
unsuccessfully, to secure an ordinary servitude of way by contract. 
On the basis of the above law and economics discussion, the following 
conclusions can be made. The granting of a right of way of necessity by court order 
is only justified where it is difficult or unreasonably difficult for the dominant owner to 
acquire a negotiated right of way. Therefore, the dominant owner must satisfy the 
court that she could not reach an agreement with the servient owner for the creation 
of an ordinary servitude. Other than that, the granting of the right of way of necessity 
by court order cannot be justified; even when it has been proved that the right of way 
is necessary for practical and policy reasons. Insisting on a system of property rules 
corresponds with the individualistic approach discussed earlier because both 
advocate strong, absolute protection of individual property rights. By contrast, a 
system that allows some room for liability rules corresponds with the social approach 
discussed earlier because, as Calabresi and Melamed argue, society needs to fall 
back on liability rules in instances where transaction costs are too high to enable the 
transfer of property rights in the open market.89 Accordingly, the choice of a liability 
rule is justified because it facilitates a combination of efficiency and distributive 
results which would be difficult to reach under a pure property rule.90 In other words, 
where the dominant tenement is landlocked; there are sound practical and policy 
reasons to unlock the land for the sake of efficient use; and the owner is unable to 
secure a servitude of way by contract then courts should be able to intervene to 
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assist the landlocked owner to get access to the public road that is reasonably 
necessary for efficient use of the land in the public interest.   
 
3 6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the justifications for allowing the courts to enforce the 
common law right of way necessity. As a point of departure, the chapter shows why 
it is necessary to have a right of way of necessity in certain circumstances for 
efficient land use. 
The chapter shows that the right of way of necessity is based largely on 
considerations of public policy, which encourages the efficient use of land. However, 
granting a right of way of necessity by court order is not based on reasonableness; 
there is a significant difference between necessity and reasonableness. Public policy 
discourages landlocking of land because valuable land should never be taken out of 
use merely because of inaccessibility; it must always be possible to put land to 
efficient use. When promoting the efficient use of land, public policy simultaneously 
ensures promotion of both the individual’s economic interest and the social interest 
in efficient use of the land. It is argued in the chapter that the right of way of 
necessity does more than just benefit the individual; instead, it also benefits the 
public by opening up the potential of land as a means of production and by allowing 
the efficient use of private property to benefit society through increased productivity; 
availability of valuable resources and products; creation of jobs; and establishing a 
tax basis. 
The chapter supplements the policy argument by referring to two jurisprudential 
views or approaches to the right of way of necessity, the individualistic and the social 
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approach. The individualistic view offers a strict approach to the right of way of 
necessity and only allows the granting of this servitude under truly exceptional or 
emergency circumstances. This approach is primarily concerned about the 
protection of the institution of ownership. By contrast, the social approach offers a 
more flexible approach to the right of way of necessity. The social approach is 
primarily concerned about the social interest in the efficient use of land. It is more 
public-policy oriented and focuses on the efficient use of land that benefits the public. 
South African case law recognises both these approaches; it is shown in the chapter 
that the South Africa case law relating to the right of way of necessity has developed 
from a strict approach to a more flexible approach to allow the granting of a right of 
way of necessity for purposes of promoting the efficient use of land even in instances 
where existing access to the public transport systems is merely inadequate for 
efficient use of the land. 
Besides the public policy and the social benefit argument, the chapter goes 
further to show in terms of law and economics theory under which circumstances the 
courts are justified in enforcing a right of way of necessity. The chapter considers the 
Coase theorem and Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between property rules and 
liability rules. The implication of the Coase theorem is that courts are not justified in 
enforcing a right of way of necessity where the dominant owner can secure a 
servitude of way by contract. Accordingly, courts will only be justified in enforcing the 
right where it is proved that it was impossible for the dominant owner to acquire a 
negotiated servitude of way. The same implication follows from the distinction 
between property rules and liability rules. For a system dominated by property rules, 
the dominant owner who needs a right of way to connect to a public road must 
negotiate with the servient owner. On the other hand, a system that allows room for 
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liability rules will also allow a right of way of necessity to be imposed by court order, 
against payment of compensation. The essence of the distinction between property 
rules and liability rules is that courts are not justified to impose a right of way of 
necessity if it is possible for the dominant owner to acquire a servitude of way 
through negotiation. It is only where it is impossible to acquire such a servitude 
through a contract that the courts can be justified to enforce it. The chapter shows 
that there is a link between a system that insists upon property rules and the 
individualistic approach and also between a system that allows room for liability rules 
and the social approach. Property rules and the individualistic approach are more 
concerned about the protection of property rights, whereas liability rules and the 
social approach are willing to allow the limitation of property rights for purposes of 
efficient use of land for the public benefit.  
In essence, courts are justified to enforce a right of way of necessity in favour of 
landlocked land if such a servitude will ensure the efficient use of the land for the 
landowner and also for society in general. However, creating a right of way of 
necessity by court order will only be justified if the dominant owner can prove that 
she unsuccessfully tried to negotiate for a right of way with the servient owner. In 
other words, courts will only be justified in enforcing the right of way of necessity 
where an ordinary right of way could not be acquired through negotiations. Arguably, 
in absence of proof that the owner of the landlocked land have tried unsuccessfully 
to secure a servitude of way by contract, the requirement of necessity has not been 
satisfied. 
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Chapter 4: Section 25 analysis 
 
4 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that there are valid policy reasons for having the 
right of way of necessity and for allowing courts to enforce this right.1 What remains 
is to examine the possible constitutional implications of a court awarding a right of 
way of necessity in view of the justifications discussed in the previous chapter. This 
chapter considers two constitutional issues; firstly, whether the granting of a right of 
way of necessity by a court constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of the servient 
owner’s property rights that may be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
Secondly, the chapter ascertains whether the granting of a right of way of necessity 
could also constitute expropriation of the servient owner’s property rights in line with 
section 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. 
There are a few remarks in case law and academic literature about the 
enforcement of the right of way of necessity constituting an expropriation.2 However, 
some authors argue that the granting of the right of way of necessity does not 
                                            
1
 See chapter 3 above. 
2
 The Appellate Division in Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 677H remarked that the 
court process granting a permanent right of way of necessity amounts to an expropriation of rights. In 
Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) para 32, the Land Claims Court also remarked 
that: “A servitude imposed upon a landowner without his consent could well constitute an 
expropriation.” Similar remarks were made by Hurt J in English v CJM Harmse Investments CC & 
Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 421I when he observed that the granting of a permanent right of way of 
necessity is virtually similar to an expropriation of property. Moreover, A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 
(2
nd
 ed 2001) 56-57 describes the process of granting a way of necessity against the will of the 
servient owner as a “forced acquisition of rights”, which amounts to expropriation. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
amount to expropriation.3 The reason for the latter argument is that there is no 
common law authority for expropriation under South African law.4 The authority to 
expropriate derives exclusively from statutory authority.5 Consequently, courts do not 
have the inherent authority to expropriate property.6 This in effect means that 
enforcing the common law regarding the right of way of necessity by a court order 
does not amount to expropriation under South African law. This chapter proceeds on 
the basis that the right of way of necessity does not amount to expropriation, and for 
that reason this chapter ignores the section 25(2) issue and focuses specifically on 
section 25(1).7  
Section 25(1) provides that no one may be deprived of property unless the 
deprivation is in terms of law of general application, and that no law may allow 
                                            
3
 See in this regard AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 346; PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 565 fn 439; J Scott 
“The difficult process of applying easy principles: Three recent judgments on via ex necessitate’’ 
(2008) 41 De Jure 164-174 167. 
4
 A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93; A Gildenhuys & GL Grobler “Expropriation” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 10 Part 3 (2
nd
 ed 2012) para 12. See also AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 346, 453. 
5
 See in this regard Joyce & McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658 671; 
Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 81; Pretoria City Council v 
Modimola 1966 (3) SA 250 (A) 258H. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 
2011) 453; AJ Van der Walt “Constitutional property law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4; A 
Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 10, 49; A Gildenhuys & GL Grobler “Expropriation” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 10 Part 3 (2
nd
 ed 2012) para 12. 
6
 Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA) para 14. See 
also AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4, who 
argues: “[c]ourts can only have the power to order expropriation if that power is granted to them 
specifically, and that would be by way of exception.” 
7
 The granting of a right of way of necessity has in few occasions been associated with a section 
25(1) deprivation. See in this regard English v CJM Harmse Investments CC & Another 2007 (3) SA 
415 (N) 422B-D. See also MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 106. 
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arbitrary deprivation of property.8 Using the methodology laid down in First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB 
decision”),9 the chapter evaluates whether the granting and enforcing of a right of 
way of necessity is constitutionally valid. However, before proceeding with the 
constitutional analysis, this chapter starts by briefly discussing the implications of the 
right of way of necessity for the servient owner.  
 
4 2 The implications of the right of way of necessity for the servient owner 
The right of way of necessity, including the manner of its establishment, has certain 
implications for the property rights of the servient owner. This common-law created 
and court-enforced servitude places restrictions on the property rights of the servient 
owner. Some authorities would refer to these restrictions as a detachment of 
entitlements from ownership.10 It is said that the granting of a servitude detaches 
some of the entitlements resulting ownership from the ownership of the servient 
tenement and attaches them to another person’s property as part of his ownership of 
                                            
88
 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 60. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 545. 
10
 See in this regard Jackson v Aventura Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C) 526; Maclear Divisional Council v 
Norton 1918 CPD 16 23; Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280; 
In re Bennett & Green and the Bank of Africa, Limited (1901) 22 NLR 404 414. For criticism of this 
view see CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 540 fn 2; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458; MJ De 
Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in 
South Africa (1996) 785-817 786-787. 
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a separately owned dominant tenement (in case of praedial servitudes).11 However, 
this argument is disputed by both Van der Merwe12 and De Waal.13 Both authors 
argue that ownership should never be regarded as a bundle of rights capable of 
being detached from ownership; instead, it should be seen as a single right with 
different entitlements that could be limited in some way.14 They further argue that the 
bundle of right theory undermines the nature of servitude as a limited real right.15 
According to De Waal, the granting of a servitude should rather be described as a 
restriction being placed on one or more of the entitlements of ownership,16 and 
according to Van der Merwe placing a restriction on entitlements does not deprive 
ownership of its character.17 On the basis of Van der Merwe and De Waal’s 
argument, one could argue that the granting of the right of way of necessity merely 
amounts to temporary restriction of some of the servient owner’s entitlements, but 
not a separation of rights from ownership. Of course, restrictions created by the 
                                            
11
 See in this regard Dreyer Letterstedt’s Executors (1865) 5 Searle 88 99; Consistory of Steytlerville v 
Bosman (1893) 10 SC 67 69. 
12
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 540 fn 2. 
13
 MJ De Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 786-787. 
14
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 540 fn 2; MJ De Waal 
“Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South 
Africa (1996) 785-817 786-787. 
15
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 (2
nd
 ed 2010) para 540 fn 2; MJ De Waal 
“Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South 
Africa (1996) 785-817 787. 
16
 MJ De Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 787. 
17
 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2
nd
 ed 1989) 174; MJ De Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D 
Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 786-787. 
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granting of a permanent right of way of necessity would remain for as long as the 
situation of necessity exists. 
This section identifies specific entitlements of ownership that are affected by 
the granting and enforcement of the right of way of necessity. Ownership consists of 
several entitlements, which amongst others include the entitlement to use and 
enjoyment, the entitlement to possess, the entitlement to dispose of the property, 
and the entitlement to exclude others.18 The imposing of a right of way of necessity 
by operation of law places restrictions on some of these entitlements, specifically the 
entitlement of use and enjoyment, the entitlement to possess, the entitlement to 
dispose, and the entitlement to exclude others. The servient owner can no longer do 
as he pleases with his property. For instance, he cannot construct a building along 
the portion where the right of way of necessity is to be exercised.19 The servient 
owner is also denied the entitlement to dispose freely over his servient tenement. 
The entitlement to dispose ordinarily allows the servient owner to have a say in all 
activities that take place on his land, including having a say as to what he wants or 
does not want on his land. However, the law restricts this entitlement in a way that it 
forces him to allow for the establishment of a servitude of way against payment of 
compensation. Forcing the servient owner to allow the dominant owner to come onto 
                                            
18
 Regarding entitlements of ownership see PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 92-93; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F 
du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (2007) 469-556 470; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ 
Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South 
Africa (2010) 93; C Lewis “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta Juridica 241-267. 
See also Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20B-C; Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 
(4) SA 614 (C) 617I. 
19
 See for instance Jackson v Aventura Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C), where the servient owners raised 
an argument that the granting of the right of way of necessity over their land will affect their use and 
enjoyment of the land, on which they intended constructing two hotels, a conference center and 
restaurant. 
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and use the servient tenement restricts the servient owner’s entitlement to exclude 
because he no longer has the power to decide who could enter onto his land. In 
terms of South African common law, the property owner is normally entitled to 
exclude all other persons from his land unless limited by the law.20 The creation of 
the right of way of necessity restricts this entitlement and also affects the servient 
owner’s entitlement to possess, being the entitlement to be in exclusive physical 
control of the servient tenement.21  
It is therefore clear that the common law right of way of necessity limits the 
servient owner’s ownership. Ownership is never absolute under South African law; it 
is subject to legal restrictions22 imposed by both public and private law.23 Public law 
restrictions are imposed in the interests of society as a whole or in the interests of a 
certain section of the community.24 On the other hand, private law imposes 
restrictions in the interest of private individuals with the purpose of harmonising 
conflicting property interests, in particular between neighbouring owners.25 Public law 
                                            
20
 Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd v Administrator, SWA & Another 1958 (4) 
SA 572 (A) 636D; Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd and Another v Police Commissioner of the 
Western Cape and Others 2004 (5) BCLR 538 (C) 542, 543-544. 
21
 See C Lewis “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta Juridica 241-267 254.  
22
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 91, 93; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African law (2007) 469-556 473. 
23
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 91; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles 
of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 94-95; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (2007) 469-556 473. 
24
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 95; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles 
of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 117; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (2007) 469-556 473-474. 
25
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 95; H Mostert, A Pope, PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles 
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limitations could include limitations imposed or required by the Constitution,26 
specifically section 25. It is therefore important to establish whether the limitations 
created by the common law right of way of necessity are valid in terms of section 25 
of the Constitution. In other words, it is necessary to establish whether the 
interference with the servient owner’s entitlements that results from the granting of a 
right of way of necessity over the servient land amounts to a deprivation in terms of 
section 25(1), and, if so, whether that deprivation is constitutionally valid.  
 
4 3 The FNB methodology 
4 3 1 Introduction 
The FNB decision27 is currently the leading Constitutional Court judgement as far as 
the property clause is concerned.28 This decision authoritatively explains the 
interpretation and application of the property clause in constitutional property 
disputes. The Court in FNB held that the function of the property clause is to both 
protect existing private property rights and promote the public interest, and at the 
same time to strike a proportionate balance between the two functions.29 This is 
                                                                                                                                       
of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 132; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law (2007) 469-556 476. 
26
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 95. 
27
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
28
 See the remarks by Nkabinde J in Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35, 
where she describes the FNB decision as the leading judgement regarding the property clause in the 
Constitution. 
29
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
50. 
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supported by Van der Walt, who adds that constitutional protection of property is 
different from private-law protection of property.30 According to Van der Walt, the 
function of the property clause is not to guarantee and insulate existing property 
rights against any interference, but to establish and maintain the appropriate balance 
between individuals’ vested rights and the public interest through regulatory 
deprivations (amongst other measures) that promote or protect legitimate public 
interests.31 The FNB decision also distinguishes between deprivation and 
expropriation, holding that all expropriations are deprivations, but only some 
deprivations are expropriations, deprivation being a wider category that includes the 
narrower category of expropriation.32 Most importantly for this chapter, the 
Constitutional Court in the FNB decision developed a methodology for the purpose of 
deciding constitutional property disputes in a form of set questions.33 Roux outlines 
the questions that structure the FNB methodology as follows:  
“(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the operation of 
[the law in question] amount to property for purpose of s 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state 
concerned]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under s 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of s 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the [expropriation] comply with the requirements of s 25(2)(a) and 
(b)? 
                                            
30
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 91. 
31
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 91. 
32
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 
57-58. 
33
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
46. 
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(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under s 36?”34 
This methodology gives interpretative meaning to section 25 of the Constitution, 
most importantly section 25(1), which sets out two formal requirements for 
deprivation of property, namely that deprivation must be in terms of law of general 
application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation.35 Until the FNB decision, it 
was not clear what is meant by “arbitrary deprivation”.36 Roux argues that the 
arbitrariness test dominates the whole of the constitutional property inquiry.37 In 
terms of the FNB decision, a deprivation of property is regarded as “arbitrary” for 
purposes of section 25 when the “law of general application” does not provide 
sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair.38 
Using the FNB methodology, the next part of the chapter seeks to determine 
whether the granting of the right of way of way of necessity establishes a deprivation 
of property and, if so, whether that deprivation satisfies the section 25(1) 
requirements. 
 
                                            
34
 T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 3, footnotes omitted. Roux’s formulation of the questions derives from First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
35
 For an extensive discussion on the formal requirements, see AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 218-225. 
36
 T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 2. 
37
 T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 3. 
38
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
100. 
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4 3 2 Does the law complained of affect “property” as understood by section 25?  
The previous section shows that the granting of a right of way of necessity affects 
the servient owner’s property interests, specifically some of his entitlements of 
ownership. The question is whether the property interests in question qualify as 
property for purposes of section 25(1).39  
Section 25 does not define “property”, but simply states that no one may be 
deprived of “property” unless the deprivation is in terms of law of general 
application40 and that no law may allow arbitrary deprivation of “property”.41 
According to section 25, “property” is not restricted to land.42  
The Constitutional Court in In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 199643 was faced with the task of defining “property” for purposes of 
section 25 of the Constitution. In that case, there was an objection raised against the 
property clause to the effect that it does not expressly protect the right to acquire, 
hold and dispose of property.44 This objection raised the question whether the 
formulation of the right to property adopted by the Constitutional Assembly complies 
with the test of “universally accepted fundamental rights”.45 The Constitutional Court, 
after considering foreign constitutional jurisdictions, reached the conclusion that 
there is no universally recognised formulation of the concept “property” and therefore 
                                            
39
 See in this regard T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 10. 
40
 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
41
 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
42
 Section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
43
 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
44
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 70. 
45
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 71. 
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dismissed the objection.46 The Court held that the mere fact that section 25 is 
formulated in a negative and not a positive form and that it does not contain an 
express recognition of the right to acquire and dispose of property does not 
necessarily mean that it does not comply with “universally accepted fundamental 
rights”.47  
The Constitutional Court in the FNB decision once again had a chance to give a 
meaning to the section 25 concept of property but avoided this task, holding that it is 
“practically impossible to furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a 
comprehensive definition of property for purposes of section 25.”48 However, the 
Court held that corporeal movables are protected in section 25.49 This appears from 
a dictum by the Court that ownership of corporeal movables must, just like ownership 
of land, “lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property, both as regards the 
nature of the right involved and the object of the right”.50 According to Roux this 
                                            
46
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 72. The CC reached this conclusion after 
finding that some democracies provide no express protection of property in their constitutions or bills 
of rights whereas others do. At the same time, of those jurisdictions that do have a property clause, 
some formulate the right to property simply in a negative way, restraining state interference with 
property rights, whereas others express the right in a positive way, providing for the right to acquire 
and dispose of property (see para 72). 
47
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 72. 
48
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
51. 
49
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
51. 
50
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
51. 
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dictum, specifically relating to ownership of land, confirms the importance of the 
provision in section 25(4)(b) that “property is not limited to land.”51 Van der Walt 
argues that for purposes of section 25, “property” can be regarded as a range of 
objects: both tangible and intangible, various traditional property rights and interests 
both real and personal, and a wide range of other rights and interests which (in the 
civil-law tradition) have never been regarded as property.52 He further argues that 
section 25 must be interpreted to mean all property rights, and that “property” in the 
sense of rights must include ownership, limited real rights and some personal 
rights.53 The Natal Provisional Division of the High Court held in Geyser and Another 
v Msunduzi Municipality and Others54 that property for purposes of section 25 
includes “property rights such as ownership and the bundle of rights that makes up 
ownership such as the right to use property or to exclude other people from using it”. 
This decision is confirmed by Roux, who argues in favour of section 25 protection of 
the traditional incidents of ownership.55 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert also argue 
that incidents of ownership such as “the right to use the thing”, and “the right to 
dispose of it at will” should be protected in terms of section 25.56 This argument 
seems to derive support from the FNB arbitrariness test, which amongst other 
                                            
51
 T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 10. 
52
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 107. Since the right of way of necessity 
only relates to land, it is unnecessary to consider all the property interests as mentioned by Van der 
Walt. Therefore this discussion will be limited to those property interests pertaining to land.  
53
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 129, 139. 
54
 2003 (5) SA 18 (N) 37A. 
55
 T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 
3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) ch 46 13. 
56
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 537. 
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aspects determines whether a deprivation embraces all or only some of the incidents 
of ownership.57  
The right of way of necessity restricts certain entitlements of ownership of land, 
specifically ownership of the servient tenement, and it is clear that ownership of land 
enjoys section 25 protection. On the basis of the discussion above and the previous 
section, it can be concluded that property interests are indeed affected by the 
granting of a right of way of necessity and that these interests are protected by 
section 25 since they derive from ownership. 
 
4 3 3 Has there been a deprivation of property? 
Once it has been concluded that the entitlements of ownership that are affected by 
the granting of a right of way of necessity are property for section 25 purposes, the 
next step is to establish whether the placing of restrictions on these entitlements of 
ownership amounts to “deprivation of property” in terms of section 25(1). The 
question is what exactly constitutes deprivation for purposes of section 25(1)? It is 
said that there is currently no comprehensive definition of deprivation recognised in 
case law.58 However, deprivation is normally associated with some form of state 
interference with private property.59 It is mostly about regulation of the use, 
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enjoyment and exploitation of property and it is usually not compensated.60 
Furthermore, deprivation does not involve the taking away or state acquisition of 
property but just the regulation of its use.61 The Court in FNB, referring to Van der 
Walt, acknowledges that the term “deprive” or “deprivation” is sometimes misleading 
or confusing because it can create the wrong impression that it refers to the taking 
away of property (expropriation), whereas according to the Court it does not.62 
Despite the confusion, the Court concludes that any interference with the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of private property constitutes some form of deprivation in 
respect of the person having title or right to or in the property concerned.63 On the 
basis of this FNB definition of deprivation, the restriction imposed on some of the 
entitlements of ownership caused by the granting of the right of way of necessity 
constitutes a deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1). The question is 
how significant the interference should be for it to be regarded as deprivation for 
purposes of section 25(1). There seems to be a conflict of views in case law 
regarding this question. In Nhlabathi and Others v Fick (“Nhlabathi”),64 the Land 
Claims Court held that the appropriation of a grave by an occupier authorised by 
section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (“ESTA”)65 constituted 
deprivation for purposes of section 25(1). The court reached this conclusion despite 
it accepting that the establishment of a grave will in most instances constitute a 
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minor interference with the landowner’s property rights.66 This decision could be 
interpreted to mean that it does not matter whether the interference is small or 
material and that any interference will amount to deprivation of property for purposes 
of section 25(1). However, the Constitutional Court in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality 
and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government 
and Housing, Gauteng, and Others (“Mkontwana”)67 took a different approach from 
that of FNB and Nhlabathi by stating that whether a deprivation occurred “depends 
on the extent of the interference with or limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation”.68 
According to the Court, a deprivation of property occurs when there is “at the very 
least, substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions 
on property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society”.69 Van der 
Walt criticises this approach, arguing that limiting deprivation to interferences that 
exceed the normal regulatory functions of a democratic society will effectively defeat 
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the purpose of section 25(1).70 According to him, limiting the concept of deprivation 
to “abnormal or excessive regulatory deprivation” will serve no purpose at all 
because the purpose of section 25(1) is not just to prevent excessive regulation, but 
also to authorise and control normal regulation.71 Van der Walt concludes that all 
normal regulatory restrictions on the use and enjoyment of property should be 
considered as section 25(1) deprivations.72  
The deprivation question was further complicated in subsequent Constitutional 
Court judgements, namely Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public 
Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another 
(“Reflect-All”)73 and Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others (“Offit”).74 In Reflect-All the Constitutional Court 
referred to the definition in both FNB and Mkontwana but refrained from following the 
narrow Mkontwana definition of deprivation, instead opting for the wider FNB one, 
namely that any interference with property amounts to deprivation.75 On that basis, 
the Court decided that section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport 
Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 constitutes a deprivation of the applicants’ use, 
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enjoyment and exploitation of their properties.76 However, the Constitutional Court in 
Offit also referred to the definition in both FNB and Mkontwana but opted for the 
narrower Mkontwana definition of deprivation, holding that there must “at least be 
substantial interference” for such interference to qualify as deprivation for the 
purposes of section 25(1).77 The same narrow definition of deprivation was followed 
in the recent Constitutional Court decision of Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals 
and Energy,78 where Mogoeng CJ held that deprivation arises when property or 
rights in property are “significantly interfered with.” Van der Walt does not agree with 
the Mkontwana definition of deprivation.79 He argues that the Court in Offit did not 
actually follow the Mkontwana definition of deprivation, but in actual fact applied the 
FNB test;80 although it cannot be denied that the passage cited comes from the 
Mokontwana definition, the passage suggests that the Court in Offit “distinguished 
between insignificant and significant deprivation, rather than between ‘normal’ 
deprivation and deprivation that exceeds what is normal in an open and democratic 
society,” which is the main aspect of the Mkontwana definition.81 Finally, Van der 
Walt argues that the decision in Offit might as well have been reached on the basis 
of the FNB definition of deprivation.82 Despite the uncertainty regarding the meaning 
of deprivation, Van der Walt seems convinced that deprivation is most likely to be 
viewed in light of the wider FNB definition of deprivation, which includes any 
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limitation on the use and enjoyment of property. He describes the Mkontwana 
definition of deprivation as “confusing and contradictory” and concludes that no 
matter how small or significant limitations are they should qualify as deprivation for 
purposes of section 25(1).83 Van der Walt adds that limitations should only qualify as 
deprivation if they impose a legally perceptible burden or restriction on the use and 
enjoyment of property,84 in other words, when they are not excluded by the de 
minimis rule.85  
In view of the FNB wider definition of deprivation and Van der Walt’s definition, 
one can conclude that restrictions placed upon the servient owner’s entitlement of 
use and enjoyment, entitlement to dispose, entitlement to possess and the 
entitlement to exclude constitute deprivation for purposes of section 25(1). 
 
4 3 4 If there is a deprivation, is the deprivation in line with section 25(1)? 
Once it has been concluded that the granting of a right of way of necessity 
constitutes deprivation of property, the next step in the FNB methodology is to 
establish whether the deprivation complies with the requirements outlined in section 
25(1). Deprivation must comply with the requirements of section 25(1) for it to be 
constitutionally valid. Section 25(1) contains only two formal requirements for 
deprivation of property.86 First of all, the deprivation must be authorised by law of 
general application and secondly, such law may not allow arbitrary deprivation. 
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The first requirement requires deprivation of property to be in terms of law of 
general application. This requirement is intended to protect individuals from being 
deprived of property by laws that single them out for selective treatment in a way that 
their property rights alone are interfered with.87 The effect of this requirement is that 
only law of general application may deprive the servient owner of his entitlements of 
ownership. Considering the fact that the right of way of necessity is a common law 
rule, the only question is whether the common law qualifies as law of general 
application for purposes of section 25(1). It is generally accepted that all legislation 
qualifies as law of general application for purposes of section 25.88 In the FNB case 
the court did not interpret what constitutes “law” of general application; instead, it just 
concluded that the challenged statutory provision constituted law of general 
application.89 However, in other decisions outside the ambit of section 25 the 
common law has been recognised as law of general application.90 Although there is 
yet to be a case challenging the constitutional validity of a common law rule in terms 
of section 25(1), Van der Walt is convinced that common law rules also qualify as 
law of general application for purposes of section 25(1).91 He argues that: 
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“The fact that section 25(1) refers to “law of general application” (as opposed to a 
law of general application) ensures that regulatory deprivation of property can 
also be authorised by the rules of common and customary law, and at the same 
time it subjects the common law to the requirement that it should not authorise 
arbitrary deprivation of property”.92 
It can be assumed on the basis of Van der Walt’s argument that the common law 
rule that regulates the creation of a right of way of necessity constitutes law of 
general application for purposes of section 25(1). 
In terms of the second requirement, law of general application should not allow 
arbitrary deprivation of property. It is argued that it is hard but not impossible to 
imagine that a deprivation authorised by rules of common law can constitute an 
arbitrary deprivation.93 Still, it is important to subject the common law principles that 
regulate the creation of a right of way of necessity to the FNB non-arbitrariness 
test.94 According to Roux, this test is the most crucial part of every property clause 
challenge.95 
It was held in FNB that deprivation is “arbitrary” in terms of section 25 when the 
law complained of “does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in 
question or is procedurally unfair.”96 In other words, the deprivation would be 
arbitrary if it is procedurally unfair or (substantively) if there is insufficient reason for 
it. Van der Walt describes this non-arbitrariness requirement in two ways. Firstly, he 
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views the non-arbitrariness requirement as a provision which ensures formal 
procedural justice, described as a “thin”, low level of scrutiny, rationality test which 
ensures that deprivation of property is rationally connected to some legitimate 
government purpose.97 Secondly, the non-arbitrariness requirement requires that 
any law that permits deprivation must establish sufficient reason for the deprivation, 
what he describes as a “thick”, proportionality-type interpretation.98 In other words, 
the deprivation should not only be rationally linked to a legitimate government 
purpose but must also be justified by the purpose that it serves.99 
Nothing was said in FNB regarding what constitutes procedural fairness for 
purposes of section 25(1). Procedural arbitrariness would probably not arise in cases 
concerning the granting of the right of way of necessity because the right of way of 
necessity is enforced by a court order. In the process, courts take into account all the 
relevant factors that would exclude procedural arbitrariness before deciding to 
enforce the right, and that by definition is not procedurally unfair. On this basis, it is 
safe to conclude that as long as the deprivation of the servient owner’s property 
rights that results from granting of a right of way of necessity is subject to judicial 
scrutiny, the problem of procedural arbitrariness would not arise.100  
The Court in FNB focused specifically on the second criterion of the non- 
arbitrariness requirement, namely substantive arbitrariness. In terms of this 
requirement, a deprivation is arbitrary when the law in question does not provide 
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sufficient reason for the deprivation.101 The Constitutional Court in FNB went on to 
explain how sufficient reason must be established, holding that there must be an 
evaluation of the relationship between the deprivation in question and the purpose of 
the law in question.102 To achieve this, the Constitutional Court stated that “a 
complexity of relationships” must be considered,103 which includes the relationship 
between the purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected 
by the deprivation;104 the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, and 
the nature of the property; and the extent of the deprivation of the property in 
question.105 Regarding the extent of the deprivation, the Constitutional Court held 
that the purpose of the deprivation must be more compelling when the deprivation in 
question concerns ownership of immovable property and corporeal movable property 
rather than when it concerns a less extensive property interest, and also when the 
deprivation embraces all rather than just some of the entitlements of ownership.106 
The Constitutional Court also held that the substantive arbitrariness test is context-
based107 and that the test can vary from mere rationality to something closer to the 
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section 36(1) proportionality test of the Constitution.108 The following paragraphs 
consider the factors mentioned in FNB109 in the context of the right of way of 
necessity in order to determine whether there are sufficient reasons for the 
deprivation of the servient owner’s entitlements of ownership to justify the judicial 
granting of a right of way of necessity. 
The end sought by the law relating to the right of way of necessity is to connect 
a piece of landlocked land to the public transport systems. This purpose is based on 
public policy aimed at encouraging the efficient use of land, and it also fulfils a social 
function in that it opens the potential for private landlocked land to be exploited fully 
for the public benefit.110 The means employed (the deprivation of certain of the 
servient owner’s entitlements) entails the enforcement of a servitude of right of way 
over the servient tenement by courts that are authorised to do so by the common 
law. Furthermore, it seems that the courts are only justified to impose this deprivation 
in cases where it is unreasonably difficult or impossible for the dominant owner to 
acquire an ordinary servitude of way by contract.111 It is difficult to think of any other 
mechanism to resolve the problem of landlocked land in instances where it is 
impossible for the dominant owner to acquire an ordinary servitude of way, than the 
one provided by the common law through the intervention of the courts. Without the 
judicial possibility to create a right of way of necessity, landlocked land would be 
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removed from efficient use and also from providing the public benefit that would 
result from efficient use. Generally speaking, it can be concluded that there is a 
legitimate reason for creating the judicial possibility to grant a right of way of 
necessity that would protect both the individual dominant owner’s interests in 
efficient use of his land and the public interest in efficient use of valuable land. 
There also seems to be sufficient reason for imposing the servitude on the 
affected servient property, thereby establishing the nexus between the affected 
property and the purpose that the FNB decision requires. Despite the fact that the 
affected servient owner is not the cause of the landlocking situation, the servient 
owner happens to be the person whose property lies between the dominant 
tenement and the sought public road. This in effect establishes the required 
connection between the servient owner’s land and the purpose which the right of 
way of necessity serves. The servient tenement happens to be that adjoining 
property (land) that lies between the dominant tenement and the nearest public road 
which the dominant tenement seeks connection to.112  
As far as the nature and extent of the deprivation are concerned, the right of 
way of necessity also seems to satisfy the FNB requirement of proportionality. The 
right of way of necessity does not affect the entire right of ownership of the servient 
land, even though quite extensive entitlements of ownership, specifically the 
entitlements to use and enjoyment, possess, dispose, and exclude, are restricted.113 
Moreover, the extent of the deprivation of these entitlements is not severe in that it 
does not affect the entire property but just a small portion of the servient tenement, 
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which the servient owner is not entirely excluded from using himself either. This 
aspect is particularly clear provided that the common law requirement, according to 
which the court must identify the route of the servitude in a location on the servient 
land that would cause the smallest possible burden, is met. Moreover, the servient 
owner is compensated for the loss caused by the deprivation.  
If one takes into account the above analysis, the deprivation caused by the right 
of way of way of necessity should be described as not very severe, and therefore 
something closer to rationality analysis (as opposed to almost full proportionality) will 
probably suffice. On that level of analysis, it is reasonably easily concluded that 
considering the legitimate purpose served by granting a right of way of necessity, 
together with the clear and direct connection between such purpose, the servient 
owner, and the servient tenement, it appears that the law relating to right of way of 
necessity does not permit arbitrary deprivation of property. In other words, there are 
sufficient reasons to justify the deprivation caused by a right of way of necessity. 
The analysis above has to be qualified, though: the deprivation resulting from 
granting a right of way of necessity and thereby imposing a restriction on the servient 
landowner’s entitlements of use, enjoyment, disposition and exclusion against his will 
can only be non-arbitrary if the servitude is granted by court order, the court having 
considered and applied the common law requirements for the right of way of 
necessity quite strictly. This includes, above all, the requirement of necessity, which 
means that the potential dominant owner who claims a right of way of necessity must 
prove that his land has no reasonable access to the public transport systems; that 
having such access is objectively necessary for the efficient use of the dominant 
land; and that efficient use of the land will have some public benefit (which could be 
in the form of creation of jobs, production of food or other valuable produce, and 
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creating a tax base). Above all, the potential dominant owner must prove that it is 
unreasonably difficult or impossible (for some valid reason not of his own making) to 
obtain a servitude of right of way through negotiation with the servient owner; in the 
absence of proof of this factor there is no real necessity and the court would not be 
justified to impose a servitude by force. 
In terms of the analysis above it can be concluded that judicial granting of a 
right of way of necessity generally amounts to non-arbitrary deprivation, in other 
words that it complies with section 25(1) of the Constitution. Where the deprivation is 
found to be consistent with section 25 (1), section 36(1) analysis does not arise.114 
The next question would have been whether the deprivation amounts to an 
expropriation. However, there is no need to answer this question because it has 
already been disposed of earlier on: there is no authority for expropriation in the 
common law and the South African courts do not have the inherent power to grant 
expropriation without statutory authority.  
 
4 3 5 Can an arbitrary deprivation be justified in terms of section 36(1)? 
Assuming that the granting of a right of way of necessity failed the non-arbitrariness 
test in a particular instance, the next step of the analysis would have been to 
determine whether the limitation could be justified under section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.115 Section 36(1) provides that rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
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only if such limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society”. 
Roux argues that the application of section 36 in property clause challenges 
seems to be a repetition of the FNB arbitrariness test116 and therefore it has no 
meaningful application in section 25(1) challenges.117 This argument is supported by 
Van der Walt, who states that the requirement that deprivation should be authorised 
by law of general application also applies in section 36(1), which provides that rights 
may only be limited in terms of law of general application.118 Furthermore, the 
requirement in section 36(1) that a limitation should be reasonable and justifiable is a 
proportionality test similar to that of the FNB arbitrariness test.119 Roux is of the view 
that a deprivation which limits section 25(1) rights without being authorised by law of 
general application will never be saved by section 36.120 He further argues that a law 
which permits deprivation of property which is procedurally or substantively arbitrary 
is not likely to be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
either.121 There seems to be very little chance of an arbitrary deprivation being saved 
by the limitation clause.  
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4 4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to consider two constitutional issues associated with the 
right of way of necessity. In the first place, the chapter had to ascertain if the granting 
or enforcement of the right of way of necessity by courts amounts to an arbitrary 
deprivation of the servient owner’s property rights, which may be in conflict with 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. In the second place, the chapter had to ascertain 
whether the granting of a right of way of necessity could also lead to an expropriation 
of such property rights and, if so, whether such expropriation is in line with section 
25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. 
This chapter disposed of the second constitutional issue on expropriation by 
concluding that the right of way of necessity enforced by a court order is unlikely to 
constitute expropriation due to lack of legislation that authorises expropriation. The 
right of way of necessity is regulated by common law, which in terms of South 
African law does not provide any authority to expropriate,122 and since the courts do 
not have an inherent authority to expropriate under South African law either, the 
judicial granting of a right of way of necessity can probably never amount to 
expropriation. 
Following the above conclusion, the chapter focussed on the first constitutional 
issue, namely section 25(1) deprivation. The chapter started by identifying the 
property interests involved when the courts enforce the right of way of necessity.123 It 
is argued in section 4 2 that the property interest affected by the granting or 
enforcement of the right of way of necessity is the right of ownership, specifically 
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certain entitlements of ownership. This section argues that the enforcement of the 
right of way of necessity places restrictions on the servient owner’s entitlement of 
use and enjoyment, entitlement to possess, entitlement to dispose, and the 
entitlement to exclude. 
This chapter proceeded to discuss the first constitutional question regarding the 
right of way of necessity at section 4 3. The methodology developed in the FNB case 
was used to address the question whether the granting of the right of way of 
necessity constitutes an arbitrary deprivation in conflict with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.  
The first question in terms of this methodology was to ask if the law or conduct 
complained of affected “property” as understood by section 25. Section 4 3 2 
concluded that the granting of the right of way of necessity affects ownership of land, 
which is the servient owner’s ownership of the servient tenement. The servient 
owner is restricted from exercising some of his entitlements of ownership. Therefore 
the property affected for the purpses of section 25 is ownership, particularly certain 
entitlements thereof.  
Secondly, it had to be determined if there was a deprivation of property. It was 
argued that deprivation takes place when courts enforce the right of way of necessity 
because by doing so courts place restrictions on some of the servient owner’s 
entitlements of ownership. For this purpose the wider definition of deprivation that 
was followed in FNB was preferred in this chapter. 
Following the conclusion that the right of way constitutes a deprivation of 
property, the third step in terms of the FNB methodology was to establish if the 
deprivation is in line with section 25(1) of the Constitution. Section 25(1) provides 
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that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application 
and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. It was assumed that the 
common law principles that regulate the right of way of necessity constitute law of 
general application for purposes of section 25(1). For a deprivation to be non-
arbitrary such deprivation had to be substantively and procedurally fair.  
Regarding arbitrary deprivation, a deprivation is regarded as arbitrary if there is 
insufficient reason for the deprivation or if the deprivation is procedurally unfair.124 It 
was concluded in this chapter that the question of procedural arbitrariness is unlikely 
to arise in cases regarding the right of way of necessity because the deprivation 
takes place under judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, when courts decide on cases 
concerning the right of way of necessity, they take into account all the relevant 
factors that exclude arbitrariness. 
Regarding substantive arbitrariness, it is argued that there are sufficient 
reasons justifying the right of way of necessity and its enforcement by court order. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the policy arguments, jurisprudential arguments, 
and law and economics theory, which are discussed in chapter three.125 Public policy 
justifies having the right of way of necessity in that it promotes the efficient use of 
land. In terms of the social approach, the right of way of necessity is also justified by 
the possibility to promote efficient use of land, particularly economic efficiency, and 
also for the reason that it fulfils a social function in that the efficient use of land also 
benefits the public in general. The social approach is followed in South African case 
law, particularly in cases where lack of reasonable sufficient access affects the 
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dominant owner’s efficient use of land.126 The law and economic theory shows that 
the enforcement of the right of way of necessity by courts is justified in instances 
where it is impossible for the dominant owner to acquire a contract based servitude 
of way. It was therefore concluded that the granting of a servitude of right of way by 
court order is justified and therefore not arbitrary if the courts apply the common law 
requirements, especially the requirement of necessity, quite strictly. 
Because the granting of the right of way of necessity was found to be 
substantively and procedurally fair, the deprivation of the servient owner’s 
entitlements caused by the granting of the servitude is in line with section 25(1) and, 
thus, constitutionally compliant. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5 1 Introduction 
In South African law, the right of way of necessity is a special type of praedial 
servitude created by operation of law in favour of landlocked land (the dominant 
tenement) without access to a public road. The right of way of necessity binds 
surrounding properties immediately when the dominant tenement becomes 
landlocked.1 However, this servitude can only be imposed against one of those 
neighbouring properties (the servient tenement), if such property is deemed suitable 
to give the dominant tenement access to the public road, once the right is enforced 
by court order.2 
The right of way of necessity raises significant constitutional issues for South 
African law, particularly because of its manner of creation. The manner in which this 
servitude is created results in a servitude being imposed upon the property of the 
servient owner by court order, in other words by operation of law, instead of by 
negotiation and agreement between the relevant landowners, which is the normal 
way in which servitudes are created. It is imposed on the servient owner’s tenement 
without his co-operation or consent and even against his will. In this sense, the right 
of way of necessity is a servitude that is created by way of the state enforcing a 
transfer of rights. 
                                            
1
 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363-1413 1373. 
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Having said this, the main purpose of this study is to ascertain whether this 
servitude causes an arbitrary deprivation or even an expropriation of the servient 
owner’s property which does not comply with section 25 of the South African 
Constitution.3 The assumption is that the granting of a right of way of necessity by 
court order could possibly amount to a section 25(1) arbitrary deprivation or perhaps 
a section 25(2) expropriation. In order to answer these questions, this study 
establishes whether there are valid reasons to justify the right of way of necessity in 
general and also to justify its imposition by the courts instead of by agreement. 
To achieve the purpose of this study it was necessary in Chapter two to first set 
out the background to the right of way of necessity by discussing the general 
principles regulating this servitude. After the discussion on the law pertaining to the 
right of way of necessity, Chapter three discusses the justifications for the right of 
way of necessity. This chapter advances three justifications in favour of the right of 
way of necessity, namely public policy, the social approach, and law and economics 
theory. 
Chapter four refers back to these justifications to ascertain whether the creation 
of a right of way of necessity constitutes an arbitrary deprivation or even an 
expropriation of the affected landowner’s property. In this regard Chapter four relies 
on the methodology set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB decision”)4 for resolving 
constitutional property disputes. In terms of this methodology, the first question is 
whether the creation of a right of way of necessity by court order is in line with 
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section 25(1), that is, whether it constitutes a deprivation of property that satisfies the 
requirements of that section. With reference to case law, it is concluded in Chapter 
four that the creation of a right of way of necessity imposes restrictions on the 
servient landowner’s entitlements of use and enjoyment, disposition and exclusion 
and that the imposition of these restrictions qualifies as a deprivation of the servient 
landowner’s property for purposes of section 25(1). 
Relying on the justifications provided in Chapter three, Chapter four argues that 
the creation of a right of way of necessity by court order does not constitute an 
arbitrary deprivation of property, provided the common law requirements for the 
servitude are applied quite strictly. In this regard it is particularly important that the 
requirement of necessity is proved by the owner of the dominant land. Chapter four 
furthermore rules out the possibility that the creation of a right of way of necessity 
could cause an expropriation because there is no common law authority for 
expropriation in South African law.5 Consequently, Chapter four concludes that the 
right of way of necessity does not constitute either arbitrary deprivation or 
expropriation of property, which means that this servitude is constitutionally 
compliant. 
 
5 2 Conclusions 
5 2 1 The law relating to the right of way of necessity 
Chapter two provides an overview of the law relating to the right of way of necessity, 
specifically focussing on the general principles. The chapter briefly traces the origin 
                                            
5
 A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93; A Gildenhuys & GL Grobler “Expropriation” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 10 Part 3 (2
nd
 ed 2012) para 12. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
of the South African law regarding the right of way of necessity back to Roman law, 
which recognised the right of way to a family grave, and also to Germanic law, which 
recognised the road of egress. Roman-Dutch law adopted both the Roman law right 
of way to a family grave and the Germanic road of egress and developed them into a 
general right of way that includes all land that has no way out or does not abut onto a 
high road. This version of the servitude was received into South African law from 
Roman-Dutch law. South African law has since used it for the purpose of giving an 
owner of an inaccessible piece of land access over neighbouring land in order to 
connect to a public road. This rule was codified under the old Natal government but it 
is now exclusively regulated by the common law. Chapter two shows that the right of 
way of necessity is part of servitude law and belongs under praedial servitudes. In 
that regard the servitude can only be created in respect to immovable property, 
either rural or urban.  
Chapter two identifies two kinds of right of way of necessity, namely the 
temporary (periodic) right of way and the permanent right of way.6 It is shown that 
the two differ in that the temporary right of way is established only in emergency 
situations or occasionally, when necessity demands, whereas the permanent right of 
way of necessity is a permanent and regular means of access. Furthermore, a 
permanent right of way of necessity demands payment of compensation by the 
dominant owner to the servient owner. The chapter limits the main part of its 
discussion to the permanent right of way of necessity.7  
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Chapter two highlights the most important and problematic aspect of the right of 
way of necessity, namely the manner of creation of this servitude.8 It is shown that 
the right of way of necessity differs from ordinary servitudes in its mode of creation. 
Unlike other rights of way that are created by negotiation and agreement, followed by 
registration, the right of way of necessity is established without the consent of the 
servient owner and even against his will. It is created by operation of law9 and 
enforced by a court order. The right of way of necessity can only be enforced against 
a specific servient tenement. The role of the court is to enforce this servitude by 
confirming the existence of the right and allocating and defining a route over the 
affected servient land for the servitude. It is argued in Chapter two that the dominant 
owner may only approach the court for the enforcement of this servitude after an 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain a negotiated right of way from the servient owner.10  
Chapter two further discusses the requirements for establishing the right of way 
of necessity.11 This chapter identifies two requirements that must be met for a court 
to enforce the right of way of necessity, namely landlocking and necessity.12 
Regarding landlocking, the dominant owner must allege and prove to the court that 
her property is enclosed in such a way that she has no way out to a public road at all 
or that an alternative way is available but is inadequate to enable her reasonable 
access to the public road. As for the requirement of necessity, the dominant owner 
must allege necessity and prove to the court why it is necessary for her to get access 
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to a public road over the servient tenement. The dominant owner could for instance 
show that such access is necessary for purposes of conducting viable farming 
operations. It is, however, indicated that the dominant owner who has only herself to 
blame for the landlocking, through her own fault, design or negligence, does not 
qualify for a right of way of necessity.13 Secondly, the dominant owner who asks for 
the right of way of necessity must, to prove necessity, probably also show that she 
has unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a servitude by agreement with the 
servient landowner. To date the courts have not been clear on this point, but the 
thesis argues that the granting of a right of way of necessity by court order is not 
justified unless the dominant owner can prove necessity in the sense of not being 
able, for some valid reason, to obtain a servitude by agreement. 
Following a discussion of the requirements for the right of way of necessity, 
Chapter two discusses the conditions that accompany an award of a right of way of 
necessity.14 This includes the route for the right of way; definition of a public road; 
the relevance of the use of the dominant tenement; and compensation. For the 
dominant owner to exercise the right of way of necessity a route must be established 
over a suitable servient tenement. The route must be the shortest route that causes 
the lightest possible burden for the servient owner. To achieve this, courts are 
guided by the principle “ter naaste lage en minster schade,” which requires the right 
of way of necessity to traverse the neighbouring land that lies between the 
landlocked land and the nearest public road. In the event that the identified servient 
tenement does not satisfy the above principle, either because it is impassable or 
because the servient owner will be materially inconvenienced in the use and 
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enjoyment of her land, the court may refuse to declare the right of way of necessity 
enforceable and consequently refer the dominant owner to seek access elsewhere. 
The route for the right of way must connect the dominant tenement to a public road. 
The alleged public road must satisfy the requirement of a public road in terms of 
South African law.15 Chapter two argues that in the modern world it should be 
possible for a right of way of necessity to be granted for purposes of connecting the 
dominant tenement to public traffic systems other than a public road.16 This chapter 
argues that it should also be possible, as shown by case law,17 to grant a right of 
way of necessity for purposes other than just connecting the dominant tenement to 
public transport systems. Concerning the relevance of the use of the dominant 
tenement, Chapter two asks whether a right of way of necessity could be granted in 
favour of a dominant tenement that is used for purposes other than farming.18 In 
response to this question, the chapter concludes that the right of way of necessity 
may be granted for the benefit of land used for purposes other than agricultural 
purposes. Regarding compensation, the chapter shows that a permanent right of 
way of necessity can only be granted upon payment of compensation by the 
dominant owner to the servient owner.19 The amount of compensation could either 
be determined by the court or agreed between the parties themselves. 
Chapter two further considers the question whether the right of way of 
necessity should be registered for it to be binding upon the world. The chapter shows 
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that a right of way of necessity, like all other praedial servitudes, is a limited real right 
in land, which in principle must be registered in the deeds office.20 Nevertheless, the 
chapter shows that a right of way of necessity is an exception to this rule. The right 
of way of necessity differs from other praedial servitudes in that it does not 
necessarily have to be registered to have third-party effect. In fact, non-registration 
of this servitude does not affect its nature as a limited real right. Nevertheless, most 
courts still recommend that this servitude be registered.21 
Finally, Chapter two discusses the methods of terminating a right of way of 
necessity. Besides the ordinary methods of terminating servitudes, the right of way of 
necessity can be terminated when the situation of necessity ceases to exist. The 
chapter gives as an example a situation where a new public road is built adjacent the 
dominant tenement. It is argued that in such a situation the servient owner may ask 
the dominant owner to cancel the servitude and to stop using it regardless of 
whether it is registered or not. Alternatively, the servient owner may approach the 
court for a declaratory order lifting the right of way of necessity.  
 
5 2 2 Justification of the right of way of necessity 
Chapter three identifies three justifications for creating a servitude of right of way of 
necessity by operation of law instead of the usual agreement. The main justification 
is public policy22 and the other two justifications are the social approach23 and law 
                                            
20
 Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registry Act 47 of 1937. 
21
 See in this regard Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 676E; Aventura Ltd v Jackson NO 
and Others 2007 (5) SA 497 (SCA) 500D. 
22
 On public policy, see chapter 3 section 3 3 above. 
23
 On jurisprudential views, see chapter 3 section 3 4 above. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
140 
and economics theory.24 These justifications show why it is necessary to have a right 
of way of necessity and also why the courts, particularly, are justified to enforce this 
servitude without the cooperation of the servient owner. 
The chapter shows that the main justification for the right of way of necessity is 
based on public policy. This possibility to create this servitude by operation of law 
exists for the reason that public policy does not allow for valuable land situated in 
desirable and strategic areas to be taken out of use and commerce due to 
landlocking of land. Public policy prefers to promote the efficient use of land. In this 
sense it favours the efficient utilisation of the land and discourages the possible loss 
of land use as a result of landlocking. On this basis, Chapter three argues that the 
right of way of necessity in view of public policy safeguards the economic interests of 
the landowner as well as the social interest. The landowner benefits in the sense that 
when her land gets unlocked she can use it for any purpose that she deems fit, but 
most importantly she can put it to efficient economic use, from which she can derive 
some form of income. At the same time, unlocking the land could also benefit the 
public in the sense that efficient use of land could for instance serve as a source of 
food production; it could also provide employment; and it could also be a source of 
taxation. This in effect means that a right of way of necessity opens the potential of 
land as a means of production and allows the efficient use of private property to 
benefit society. For these reasons, the interests of society do not allow for a person 
to hold land in perpetual idleness resulting from landlocking, and therefore the state 
in the form of courts should be allowed to unlock land where that could not be done 
on the basis of private negotiations. 
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The public policy argument is complemented by the social approach discussed 
by Van Apeldoorn25 in his analysis of the Dutch jurisprudential approaches to the 
right of way of necessity.26 Van Apeldoorn distinguishes between an individualistic 
approach and a social approach. The individualistic approach is more concerned 
with the protection of ownership and only allows the granting of a right of way of 
necessity where the dominant tenement is totally landlocked. Other than that, the 
dominant owner should negotiate with the servient owner for a right of way. The 
social approach is more flexible and allows for the limitation of ownership where 
such limitation benefits the public. Van Apeldoorn argues that the right of way of 
necessity should be seen from a social point of view rather than from an 
individualistic point of view.27 The social approach is similar to the public policy 
argument regarding the efficient use of land. In terms of the social approach, a right 
of way of necessity should be imposed over the servient tenement, even in the 
absence of agreement, if the public interest demands it. The essence is that 
landlocked land should be unlocked to enable the landowner to put it into efficient 
use, and the owner should in turn fulfil a social function by using the land for the 
benefit of the society.28 The same examples discussed above regarding the public 
policy approach apply here. For instance, if the landowner uses the land for 
agricultural purposes, such land could be used to produce food in the public interest; 
the very same use of the land could create employment for the surrounding 
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community; and beneficial use of the land could serve as a source of taxation for the 
state.  
The individualistic approach and the social approach also feature in South 
African law relating to the right of way of necessity, as is evident from the influential 
Van der Merwe and Lubbe article on the right of way of necessity.29 The authors 
show how the South African law on the right of way of necessity has developed from 
a strict individualistic approach to a more flexible social approach. In terms of the 
strict approach, a right of way of necessity can only be granted in cases of absolute 
or total landlocking. This approach is said to be based on the Roman individualistic, 
absolute, and exclusive nature of ownership. The flexible approach, which allows for 
the granting of a right of way of necessity not only in cases of absolute landlocking 
but also where the existing route does not provide a reasonably sufficient access to 
the public transport system for the dominant owner to enable her, if she is a farmer, 
to conduct viable farming operations, is said to be based on the Germanic 
community-based approach. This more flexible, social approach is based on public 
policy that promotes the efficient use of land even when that requires the imposition 
of some limitations on private ownership. The right of way of necessity in this regard 
is granted for the economic viability of the required commercial operation or to satisfy 
the operational needs of the dominant tenement. South African case law has now 
formulated and approved the circumstances under which a move from an 
individualistic approach to a social approach can be justified.30 The move will be 
justified where the dominant owner satisfies the court that she has no reasonably 
sufficient access to the public transport system to enable her, if she is a farmer, to 
                                            
29
 CG van der Merwe & GF Lubbe “Noodweg” (1977) 40 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 111-125. 
30
 See in this regard chapter 3 section 3 4 above. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
143 
conduct viable farming operations.31 This approach involves evaluating the 
prejudicial effects of the existing lack of access for the continuing viable farming 
operations, compared to the prejudicial effects that would follow for the servient 
owner’s property rights if the proposed right of way of necessity were granted. If the 
prejudicial effect of not having access for the dominant owner outweighs those of the 
servient owner if a servitude is imposed, the social approach will justify the granting 
of a right of way of necessity. This ensures that the servient owner’s property rights 
are safeguarded. In this respect, the conflicting interests of the affected landowners 
are balanced. However, Chapter three indicates that the justification of the right of 
way of necessity is not justified merely by a balance of inconvenience but by 
necessity; the balance of inconvenience could at most indicate which neighbouring 
landowner’s land could be identified as the servient land and where the route of the 
servitude should be located so as to impose the smallest possible burden on the 
servient land. 
Law and economics theory provides a third ground justifying the right of way of 
necessity, particularly insofar as the enforcement of the right of the way of necessity 
by courts is concerned.32 To this end Chapter three refers to the Coase theorem,33 
together with Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between property rules and 
liability rules.34 One implication of the Coase theorem is that courts are only justified 
in enforcing a right of way of necessity where it is impossible for the dominant owner 
to obtain a negotiated right of way. Normally, the dominant owner should acquire a 
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servitude of way by contract without court interference. In terms of the Coase 
theorem, the state is only justified in forcibly transferring private rights from one 
person to another if there is a market failure, for instance because of a holdout 
situation that prevents the creation of a servitude by agreement. The same argument 
is supported by the distinction between property and liability rules. Property rules 
protect property rights to the extent that the owner can insist on keeping his property 
rights and refuse to transfer them to anyone else. On the other hand, liability rules 
can in certain instances justify forcible transfer of an unwilling owner’s property rights 
against payment of compensation. The difference between property rules and liability 
rules is consent. Under a system of property rules, consent is required for transfer of 
property rights to take place, whereas under a system of liability rules a transfer is 
sometimes enforced without the consent of the property owner. Calabresi and 
Melamed argues that property rules should be preferred over liability rules when 
transaction costs are low, that is when parties are able to negotiate for a voluntary 
transfer, and liability rules should only be preferred when a transfer is desirable for 
some overriding reason (such as economic policy) but difficult to negotiate because 
transaction costs are high, that is when parties are unable to engage in or 
successfully conclude voluntary negotiations.35 The implication of law and economics 
theory is that the right of way of necessity should not be enforced against the 
servient tenement where the dominant may acquire a servitude of way by contract. 
The enforcement of this servitude by court order symbolises a move from the strict 
property rule approach to a liability rule approach because the law allows courts to 
create a right of way for the dominant owner against her will, albeit against 
compensation. This in essence means that courts are justified to enforce a right of 
                                            
35
 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1106. 
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way of necessity against the servient tenement where it is impossible for the 
dominant owner to obtain a negotiated right of way.  
In sum, public policy and the social approach justify the necessity to have a 
right of way of necessity to encourage the efficient use of land for the benefit of the 
public (although it might also benefit the individual owner). On the other hand, law 
and economics theory implies that courts are only justified to enforce this servitude, 
even where it is necessary for some public interest, when it is impossible or difficult 
for the dominant owner to acquire a negotiated servitude of way by contract. 
 
5 2 3 Section 25 analysis 
Chapter four considers two constitutional issues relating to the right of way of 
necessity.36 Firstly, the chapter ascertains whether the granting or enforcement of a 
right of way of necessity by courts amounts to a deprivation of the servient owner’s 
property rights, which might be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. The 
second question is whether the granting of a right of way of necessity could also 
amount to an expropriation of the servient owner’s property rights and, if so, whether 
such expropriation is in line with section 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution. 
Chapter four concludes that the granting of a right of way of necessity does not 
constitute expropriation for lack of legislative authority. It is argued that the granting 
of a right of way of necessity by court order is regulated by the common law, which in 
South African law does not have the authority to order, grant or justify 
expropriation.37 Furthermore, the courts do not have the inherent authority to 
                                            
36
 See in this regard chapter 4 above. 
37
 A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2
nd
 ed 2001) 93; A Gildenhuys & GL Grobler “Expropriation” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 10 Part 3 (2
nd
 ed 2012) para 12. 
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expropriate under South African law either. A court order that grants a right of way of 
necessity in terms of the common law can therefore not amount to or establish an 
expropriation in South African law. 
The rest of Chapter four focuses on the section 25(1) question. It is argued in 
this chapter that when the courts enforce the right of way of necessity, the servient 
owner is deprived of certain entitlements of her ownership of the servient tenement. 
The servient owner is particularly deprived of her entitlement to use and enjoyment 
of a certain portion of her land, the entitlement to possess her land, the entitlement to 
dispose of her land, and the entitlement to exclude others from her land.38 Chapter 
four undertakes the section 25(1) analysis of the right of way of necessity on the 
basis of the methodology developed in the FNB case to address the question 
whether the granting of a right of way of necessity constitutes a deprivation that 
might be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. The first question in terms 
of this methodology is to ask whether the law or conduct complained of affects 
“property” as understood by section 25. It is concluded that the granting of the right 
of way of necessity affects ownership of land, which is the servient owner’s 
ownership of the servient tenement. The servient owner is restricted in exercising 
some of her entitlements of ownership of land. Therefore the property affected for 
the purposes of section 25 is certain entitlements of ownership of land.39  
Regarding the second question, namely whether the granting of a right of way 
of necessity amounts to deprivation of property, Chapter four argues that restrictions 
placed on the servient owner’s entitlements of ownership by courts qualify as a 
                                            
38
 See in this regard chapter 4 section 4 2 above. 
39
 See in this regard chapter 4 section 4 3 2 above. 
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deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1).40 Enforcing the creation of a 
servitude by operation of law involves a state-enforced transfer of the relevant 
property entitlements, which must qualify as a deprivation of property. Taking into 
account that the right of way of necessity comes into existence by operation of law, it 
is concluded that a deprivation takes place the moment the court enforces this right 
against a particular property.  
The third question in terms of the FNB methodology is to establish whether the 
deprivation complies with the requirements set out in section 25(1). Section 25(1) 
provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. It is argued 
in Chapter four that the common law rule regarding the right of way of necessity 
constitutes law of general application for purposes of section 25(1). The remaining 
issue is whether the right of way of necessity constitutes arbitrary deprivation. To this 
end, the chapter determines whether sufficient reasons exist for the deprivation and 
whether the deprivation is procedurally fair.41 For a deprivation to be non-arbitrary it 
has to be substantively and procedurally fair. In terms of the procedural fairness 
requirement, the right of way of necessity will be procedurally unfair if there are 
insufficient procedural mechanisms that protect the servient owner’s rights. This 
chapter concludes that granting of a right of way of necessity is probably always 
procedurally fair by definition, since the deprivation takes place under judicial 
scrutiny. Accordingly, when courts decide cases concerning the right of way of 
necessity, they take into account all relevant factors and the court order should 
therefore preclude procedural arbitrariness. 
                                            
40
 See in this regard chapter 4 section 4 3 3 above. 
41
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100.  
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The substantive arbitrariness test entails ascertaining whether the law 
pertaining to the right of way of necessity provides sufficient reason for the 
deprivation in question.42 The Constitutional Court held that the substantive 
arbitrariness test is context-based and will depend on the facts of a particular case.43 
Furthermore, the scope of the deprivation determines whether the test will be a mere 
rationality test or something closer to the section 36(1) proportionality test. It is 
argued in Chapter four that something closer to rationality analysis will suffice for the 
right of way of necessity to pass section 25(1) scrutiny, because the deprivation does 
not affect the entire right of ownership, but just a few entitlements of ownership. 
Furthermore, the extent of the deprivation does not apply to the entire servient land 
but only to a small portion of the servient tenement. For these reasons, the 
justification for the right of way of necessity does not have to be convincing on the 
level of full proportionality. Chapter four refers to the justifications for the right of way 
of necessity identified in Chapter three, namely public policy, the social approach, 
and law and economics theory to determine whether these justifications are sufficient 
to render the granting of a right of way of necessity non-arbitrary.  
The right of way of necessity is usually justified in terms of public policy in that it 
promotes the efficient use of land, which efficient use benefits both the dominant 
owner and society in general. In terms of the social approach, the right of way of 
necessity is also justified in terms of efficient use of land, particularly economic 
efficiency, which means that the servitude fulfils a social function in that efficient use 
of the land benefits the public in general. The public benefits in the sense that 
                                            
42
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100.  
43
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100 (h). 
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members of the public are mostly the end users of the land’s produce; from 
employment opportunities created by efficient use of the land; and also indirectly 
when efficient use of the land serves as a source of taxation. South African case law 
apparently recognises the social approach for the same reasons. Law and 
economics theory shows that enforcement of the right of way of necessity by courts 
is justified in instances where it is important to have a right of way but impossible for 
the dominant owner to acquire a negotiated right of way. Both the policy and social 
reasons justify having a right of way of necessity in a particular case, whereas law 
and economics theory justifies allowing the courts to enforce this servitude against 
the servient owner’s will. Applying these justifications in the substantive arbitrariness 
test, Chapter four concludes that sufficient reasons exist for the granting of a right of 
way of necessity by court order to be in line with section 25(1) and thus 
constitutionally compliant.  
 
5 3 Conclusions  
The right of way of necessity is a special type of praedial servitude that assists a 
landowner (dominant owner) whose land is landlocked to gain access to a public 
road over neighbouring land (servient tenement), which would allow the dominant 
owner to make efficient use of the dominant land.  
The servitude is created by operation of law as soon as the land becomes 
landlocked, thereby lacking access to a public road. It binds the surrounding 
properties as of right immediately when the dominant tenement becomes landlocked, 
but only one of the surrounding properties can be forced to carry this servitude.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
150 
The courts enforce this right of way over a specific servient tenement against 
the will of the servient owner, taking into account the capacity of the servient land to 
carry the servitude and the principle that the servitude must be established in the 
place where it will impose the smallest possible burden on the servient owner. A right 
of way of necessity can only be imposed on the understanding that the dominant 
owner pays compensation to the servient owner. The parties can agree on the 
compensation or the court can determine the amount. 
Courts should only be approached to enforce this servitude against the servient 
tenement where it is really necessary to do so, which includes the requirement that 
the dominant owner must have been unable to acquire a negotiated servitude of way 
by contract with the servient owner. The right of way of necessity cannot be enforced 
if the dominant owner caused the landlocking situation herself, through her own fault, 
design or negligence. Furthermore, this servitude cannot be enforced against a 
specific servient tenement if the land is unsuitable for exercise of this servitude, 
either because it is impassable or it will materially and unreasonably affect the 
servient owner’s use and enjoyment of the land. 
Despite the implications that creation of a right of way of necessity has for the 
servient owner’s property rights, imposing this servitude by operation of law is 
justified on the basis of policy and social reasons and by law and economics policy, 
provided that there are important public interest reasons to have the servitude in a 
particular case and that it is reasonably impossible to acquire the servitude by 
agreement. The right of way of necessity is based on public policy that promotes the 
efficient use of land and discourages landlocking of land. The social reason that 
justifies this servitude is that efficiently used land benefits not only the landowner, but 
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also society in general. In this sense the public interest does not allow land to be left 
unused simply because it is landlocked. 
Essence the justifications for the judicial enforcement of a right of way of 
necessity are sufficient to prevent the common law that regulates the judicial creation 
of a right of way of necessity from constituting an arbitrary deprivation of the servient 
owner’s property rights in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. In terms of 
South African law, a right of way of necessity cannot constitute an expropriation of 
the servient owner’s property because it is regulated by common law, which does not 
have the authority to allow or justify expropriation in South African law. 
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